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THE INSURABILITY OF CLAIMS FOR 
RESTITUTION 
Christopher C. French* 
Does and should a wrongdoer’s liability insurance cover an aggrieved 
party’s claim for restitution (e.g., a claim for the disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains)?  This article answers those questions.  It does so by first answering 
the question of whether claims for restitution are covered under the terms 
of liability insurance policies.  Then, after concluding that they are, it 
addresses the question of whether claims for restitution should be insurable 
as a matter of public policy and insurance law theory.  There are long-
standing legal and equitable principles that, on the one hand, dictate that a 
wrongdoer should not be allowed to benefit from its wrongdoing, which the 
wrongdoer would if insurance were allowed to cover claims for restitution.  
On the other hand, there are competing public policies that favor enforcing 
contracts and compensating innocent victims.  If a claim for restitution is 
covered by the terms of an insurance policy, but such claims are viewed as 
uninsurable as a matter of public policy, then policyholders would have 
paid millions of dollars in premiums for policies that provide illusory 
coverage and thousands of innocent victims with billions of dollars of 
claims would not receive compensation.  In analyzing these issues, this 
article does so by using two common examples where the insurability of 
claims for restitution are regularly implicated—intellectual property 
infringement claims under Commercial General Liability insurance policies 
(CGL policies) and shareholder fraud claims under Directors and Officers 
liability insurance policies (D&O policies). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In essence, a claim for restitution is a claim by one party to recover 
something from another party who has obtained it unlawfully (e.g., the 
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party stole it).1  The guiding principle underlying claims for restitution is 
unjust enrichment.2  The party who unlawfully has taken something from 
the other party should be required to return it or pay for it as a matter of law 
or equity.  Consequently, a common remedy in an unjust enrichment case is 
the disgorgement of the ill-gotten gains.3  But, what if the party who took 
the item no longer has it and cannot compensate the aggrieved party, which 
is the typical situation today because most people in America are judgment 
proof?4  Does and should the wrongdoer’s liability insurance cover the 
aggrieved party’s claim for restitution?  This article answers these 
questions.  To do so, one must first determine whether claims for restitution 
are covered under the terms of liability insurance policies.  If they are, then 
one must determine whether claims for restitution are and should be 
insurable as a matter of public policy and insurance law theory.  Answering 
these questions results in a clash of public policies that directly conflict. 
On the one hand, there are long-standing legal and equitable principles 
that dictate that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to benefit from its 
wrongdoing, which the wrongdoer would if insurance were allowed to 
cover claims for restitution.  On the other hand, there are the competing 
public policies that favor enforcing contracts and compensating innocent 
victims.  If a claim for restitution is covered by the terms of an insurance 
policy, but such claims are viewed as uninsurable as a matter of public 
policy, then insurers would receive windfalls in the form of millions of 
dollars of unearned premiums for policies that provide illusory coverage, 
and thousands of innocent victims would go uncompensated for losses that 
total billions of dollars.5 
 
 1.  See Mark P. Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927, 
1946 (2001) (describing that restitution can compensate for wealth someone acquires 
without consent). 
 2.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a 
(2010); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 42-63 
(1951) (explaining the development of remedies for unjust enrichment, including restitution, 
through Roman Law).  
 3.  See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust 
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2089 (2001) (stating that the relinquishment of profits is 
one of the common types of restitution cases). 
 4.  See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
603 (2006) (discussing the reasons why judgments against most people are uncollectible); 
Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1994) 
(discussing the impact insurance has on the judgment proof problem); S. Shavell, The 
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (analyzing the problems that 
result from judgment proof individuals).  
 5.  There were 210 shareholder fraud cases filed in 2008, for example, with the median 
amount of damages sought being $340 million.  See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, 
ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 3, 4, 142 (2010) (stating that in 2008 the number of shareholder 
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To help frame the discussion, consider two scenarios that commonly 
occur where the issue of the insurability of claims for restitution arises.  
Scenario One:  a company, the policyholder, purchases a Commercial 
General Liability (“CGL”) policy to cover it against any liabilities that may 
arise as a result of its business operations.  One of the products the 
policyholder sells has a brand name similar to one of the policyholder’s 
competitors.  The competitor subsequently sues the policyholder, alleging 
that the name of the policyholder’s product infringes the competitor’s 
trademark.  For relief, the competitor seeks to disgorge the policyholder of 
all of the profits the policyholder allegedly made from the allegedly 
infringing product, which totals millions of dollars.  When the policyholder 
tenders the claim to its CGL insurer, the insurer denies coverage on the 
basis that the plaintiff is seeking restitution—the disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains—which is not covered by the policy and should be deemed 
uninsurable as a matter of law and public policy. 
Scenario Two:  a publicly traded company purchases a Directors and 
Officers (“D&O”) insurance policy that covers corporate managers against 
losses arising from claims resulting from “wrongful acts” committed by 
corporate managers, which are defined to include misstatements and 
misleading statements made regarding the company.  During the normal 
course of business, the company issues periodic reports and press releases 
regarding the status and financial performance of the company.  In order to 
raise capital, the company sells additional shares of stock.  After the sale of 
the additional shares, some unfavorable business developments come to 
light that result in the company’s stock price sharply declining.  
Disappointed with the decline in the value of their investment, the new 
shareholders sue the corporate managers alleging the status reports and 
press releases issued prior to the stock sale were inaccurate and misleading 
because they failed to disclose the unfavorable business developments 
and/or did not adequately disclose the problems that resulted in the stock 
price decline.  For relief, the new shareholders request an award of money 
equal to the amount they allegedly overpaid for the stock, which totals 
several hundred million dollars.  Of course, the corporate managers could 
not personally satisfy a judgment for such an amount if they were to lose 
the case, and the shareholders know this.  The corporate managers 
eventually settle the case by agreeing to pay the new shareholders some 
small fraction of the amount they were seeking without an admission of 
liability.  When the claim is tendered to the corporate managers’ Directors 
and Officers (D&O) insurers, the insurers deny coverage on the grounds 
 
class actions concerning securities that were initiated totaled 210, and within the securities 
cases that reached settlements, investors suffered a median of $340 million in losses). 
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that they have no obligation to cover the settlement amount because the 
underlying plaintiffs were seeking restitution—the return of ill-gotten 
gains—which is not covered by the policies and should be deemed 
uninsurable as a matter of law and public policy. 
In both scenarios, the argument in favor of denying coverage is that 
the insurance should not cover claims for restitution under the terms of the 
policies, but even if such claims are covered, it is against public policy to 
allow insurance to cover claims seeking the return of money allegedly 
“stolen” or wrongfully obtained by the policyholder.  Allowing insurance 
to cover claims for restitution would create an incentive for policyholders 
to “steal” or otherwise engage in misconduct if they were permitted to then 
shift the liability for doing so to their insurers.  In terms of insurance law 
theory, if insurance were allowed to cover claims for restitution, then a 
moral hazard6 risk would be created and adverse selection7 regarding the 
 
 6.  “Moral hazard” is the concept that a policyholder will have a “tendency to take 
fewer precautions in the presence of insurance.”  Adam F. Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: 
Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century”, 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) 
(reviewing and citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND 
TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 45-48 (2008)).  See also ROBERT H. JERRY, 
II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 12 (5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he 
existence of insurance [could] have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss 
. . . . This phenomenon is called moral hazard.”).  Judge Easterbrook has described the 
theory underlying the concept by stating that “[o]nce a person has insurance, he will take 
more risks than before because he bears less of the cost of his conduct.”  W. Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985).  In essence, the idea is that a 
person who is not required to personally bear the financial consequences of his behavior will 
take less care.  The term “moral hazard” also generally encompasses situations where “[a] 
person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an 
insurer.”  MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 
(8th ed. 2005).  A lot of articles have been written regarding moral hazard and all of the 
authors generally offer similar descriptions of the concept.  See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, 
Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND 
POLICY, 42, 47 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (“Moral hazard is the 
tendency for the presence and characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient 
changes in buyers’ loss prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”); 
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the 
level of insurance claims made by the insured . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in 
precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of 
insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’ is sometimes distinguished 
from ‘morale hazard’, the former referring to deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the mere 
relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”) (citing C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & 
RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981)).  
 7.  “[A]dverse selection” is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are more 
likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.”  Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance 
Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993).  See also Tom 
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purchase of insurance would occur.  In short, allowing insurance to cover 
claims for restitution would encourage unscrupulous people or companies 
who intend to do bad things to purchase insurance to cover their intended 
wrongdoing, and policyholders that may not have specifically purchased 
insurance to cover intentional wrongdoing nonetheless would have less 
incentive to avoid wrongful conduct because they would not suffer the 
financial consequences of doing so.  Thus, the goals of punishing and 
deterring unlawful conduct would be undermined if insurance were allowed 
to cover claims for restitution. 
There are several responses to such arguments.  One, a claim for 
restitution such as the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains is covered under the 
terms of the policies when the policies are interpreted in accordance with 
the rules of policy interpretation, so insurers should not be permitted to 
collect premiums for policies that provide illusory coverage.  Two, public 
policy concerns have not prevented many types of intentional torts and 
awards of punitive damages from being covered by liability insurance so 
claims for restitution also should be insurable.  Three, one of the overriding 
public policy goals of the tort liability system is the compensation of 
innocent victims, which is a central reason why punitive damages and 
intentional torts are allowed to be covered by liability insurance.  The 
public policies that favor the enforcement of contracts and the 
compensation of innocent victims outweigh the “moral hazard” and 
“adverse selection” concerns associated with allowing insurance to cover 
claims for restitution.  Indeed, if D&O insurance is not allowed to cover 
claims for restitution, then thousands of innocent victims in shareholder 
fraud cases annually could go uncompensated for losses totaling billions of 
dollars and insurers would receive millions of premium dollars for policies 
that provide illusory coverage.8  Finally, duly elected legislatures, not 
judges, should be the parties who conduct the public policy analysis that 
could result in the divestment of insurance recoveries.  When analyzed 
 
Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 
CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373, 375 (2003) (defining adverse selection as occurring when an 
insurance risk pool includes many high risk individuals, but few low risk individuals, 
because the latter did not obtain insurance).  Thus, the basic idea of adverse selection is that 
people or entities who intend to commit torts such as intellectual property infringement 
would buy insurance to cover the resulting claims that likely will be asserted against them 
while entities that do not intend to violate the law would not.  Critics of the concept of 
adverse selection have argued that the impact the availability of insurance has on 
policyholder behavior is overblown.  See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in 
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (arguing that, in 
practice, adverse selection does not frequently occur). 
 8.  See supra notes 4-5 (describing the  judgment proof problem, and the amount of 
money at issue in shareholder cases). 
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from the legislative perspective, the will of the people could not be 
clearer—state legislatures have passed statutes across the country that 
expressly allow corporations:  1) to indemnify corporate managers for 
claims seeking restitution9 and 2) to purchase insurance to cover such 
claims.10 
This article discusses the insurability of claims for restitution in four 
parts.  Part One discusses the theoretical basis of claims for restitution as 
well as typical intellectual property infringement and shareholder cases in 
which such relief is sought.  Part Two sets forth the relevant policy 
language at issue in CGL policies and D&O policies.  Part Three addresses 
the rules of policy interpretation and applies them to the relevant CGL and 
D&O policy language at issue in intellectual property infringement and 
shareholder cases.  Part Four discusses the public policy arguments against 
and in favor of allowing insurance to cover claims for restitution, as well as 
the leading case law on the subject.  The article ultimately concludes that:  
(1) claims for restitution are covered under the existing terms of D&O and 
CGL policies in many instances; and (2) although there are important 
public policy arguments against allowing insurance to cover claims for 
restitution, such arguments are outweighed by the competing public policy 
interests that favor allowing coverage. 
 
 9.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (2015) (providing that a corporation 
can add a provision in its certificate of incorporation that affords directors with limited 
liability); BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 5, at 44 (describing that corporations can insure 
director liability under state law if they are unable to indemnify the loss); John C. Kairis, 
Disgorgement of Compensation Paid to Directors During the Time They Were Grossly 
Negligent: An Available but Seldom Used Remedy, 13 DEL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (arguing that 
directors are rarely punished for negligent actions due to limited liability and 
indemnification provisions that corporations use). 
 10.  Joseph Waren Bishop, Jr., The Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: 
Indemnification and Insurance §8.1 at 8-2 (West Supp. Nov. 2006) (“All states authorize the 
corporation to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of directors and officers against 
liabilities incurred in such capacities, whether or not the corporation would have the power 
to indemnify against such liabilities.”).  Delaware’s statute, for example, provides:  
“A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf 
of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
corporation . . . against any liability asserted against such person and incurred 
by such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person’s status as 
such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such 
person against such liability under this section.”  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(g) (2015). 
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I. CLAIMS FOR RESTITUTION 
A. The Theoretical Basis of Claims for Restitution 
In cases of unjust enrichment by wrongdoing, restitution is one of the 
available remedies.11  In essence, a claim for restitution is a claim that the 
other party obtained an unconsented transfer from the aggrieved party.12  
Restitution cases typically are one of the following types:  “(1) payments 
induced by fraud, mistake or coercion; (2) contribution among tortfeasors; 
(3) unsolicited benefits; (4) unwinding of failed contracts; (5) disgorgement 
of [ill-gotten gains]; or (6) fiduciary misconduct.”13  In all such cases, the 
plaintiff is seeking to disgorge the defendant of some benefit the defendant 
received but did not actually earn.  Consequently, the guiding principle 
underlying claims for restitution is unjust enrichment:  “Liability in 
restitution derives from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without 
payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the 
expense of the claimant.”14  Although the most common situation in which 
restitution is sought is where a benefit to one party corresponds with an 
observable loss by the other party, restitution is also available in situations 
where a person’s legally protected rights have been violated, in which case 
the claimant does not need to show he actually suffered a loss.15  In such 
situations, the defendant is required to either “restore the benefit in 
question . . . or else pay money in the amount necessary to eliminate [the] 
unjust enrichment” (i.e., disgorgement of the ill-gotten gain).16  In such 
situations, compensation of the aggrieved party is not the object of the 
relief.17 
Some scholars consider the term “unjust enrichment” to be a 
descriptive term that is used to explain why relief was granted in individual 
cases where a controlling legal principle otherwise would not have allowed 
 
 11.  Gergen, supra note 1, at 1933. 
 12.  Id. at 1959-60.  
 13.  Sherwin, supra note 3, at 2089. 
 14.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmnt. a 
(2010); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 42-63 
(1951) (discussing the underlying principle of unjust enrichment in ancient Roman law and 
the use of the principle as an “important remedy in Roman law for the prevention of unjust 
enrichment”).  
 15.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmnt. a 
(2010).   
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Kairis, supra note 9, at 9; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. b (2010) (describing the disgorgement remedy in restitution as 
another type of compensation available for an injury).   
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for an appropriate remedy,18 while other scholars consider the term to be a 
guiding principle of law rooted in morality and a sense of what is fair.19  
The drafters of the Third Restatement recognize that both concepts play a 
role in the doctrine because courts are given great flexibility in fashioning 
relief in unjust enrichment cases, and the doctrine’s foundation in English 
law was predicated upon the judge’s exercise of a moral judgment apart 
from application of the legal rules.20  Regardless of the conceptual heading 
affixed above the labels of restitution and unjust enrichment, at its heart the 
doctrine is based upon the idea that a person should not be able to profit 
from a wrong he commits.21 
As illuminated by the Third Restatement, it is a mistake, however, to 
place claims for restitution solely under the heading of “equitable relief” 
because restitution actually may be awarded based on either equitable or 
legal principles.22  For example, the equitable remedy of rescission is 
available to the aggrieved party where property is transferred as a result of 
fraud.23  On the other hand, under federal statutes, one of the principal types 
of legal relief that may be awarded for the infringement of patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks is the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.24  
 
 18.  See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Comment, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 
1133, 1134 (1959) (describing restitution as a “flexible body of case law” that allows courts 
“to consider many cases on their merits unhampered by doctrine”); Barry Nicholas, 
Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 607-10 
(1962) (explaining the criticism that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is overly broad and 
replaces other legal rules);  Sherwin, supra note 3, at 2088 n. 19, 2088-89 (citations omitted) 
(describing restitution as a “[legal] device for filling [in] the cracks”).  
 19.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-58 (1986) (discussing how judges 
reach decisions using fairness when viewing law within the principle of integrity); Sherwin, 
supra note 3, at 2088-89 (describing one view of unjust enrichment as a principle of equity 
and one definition of equity as generally about fairness).  
 20.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmts. a-b 
(2010).   
 21.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-23 (1977) (stating that 
fairness requires that “no man may profit by his own wrong”); Gergen, supra note 1, at 1934 
(explaining that the non-utilitarian principle for disgorgement is “that a person ought not 
profit from a wrong he commits”); Kairis, supra note 9, at 9 (describing disgorgement as a 
remedy “to prevent an unjust windfall to the defendant”); Christopher T. Wonnell, 
Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 177-90 (1996) 
(describing the increased harm caused by a defendant profiting from his wrong). 
 22.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (2010) 
(“Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both”); Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution 
to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (noting that the Restatement (Third) 
explains that restitution does not only involve equitable remedies).   
 23.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54 
cmt. e (2010) (describing rescission for fraud as one of the two types of cases for which 
rescission can be used as the remedy).   
 24.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (a) (2014) (stating that in the case of a trademark violation, a 
trademark owner may “recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the 
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Consequently, it is incorrect to characterize restitution as exclusively 
within the domain of equity.25 
B. Intellectual Property Infringement Claims 
Although the factual and legal basis of each type of intellectual 
property infringement case varies considerably, all such claims have at 
least two things in common:  1) the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits 
is an available remedy and 2) a plaintiff/competitor alleges that the 
defendant either improperly stole or used the plaintiff’s intellectual 
property.26  As an example of the typical facts alleged in an intellectual 
property infringement case, consider the trademark infringement and 
misappropriation of style of doing business case of American Employers’ 
Insurance Co. v. DeLorme Publishing Co.27 
In DeLorme, the plaintiff, Rand McNally Company, manufactured and 
sold a variety of maps, atlases, and computer mapping programs.28  Rand 
McNally had registered trademarks for several of its software products 
such as TRIPMAKER.29  The defendant, DeLorme Publishing Company, 
Inc., was a competitor of Rand McNally’s.30  DeLorme sold a product 
similar to Rand McNally’s TRIPMAKER and used the name 
TRIPMATE.31  In anticipation of being sued by Rand McNally in Northern 
Illinois where Rand McNally’s principal place of business was located, 
DeLorme brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court in 
Maine.32  Rand McNally asserted a counterclaim for infringement of its 
TRIPMAKER trademark under the Lanham Act,33 alleging that DeLorme 
 
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action”); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2014) (stating that the 
infringer of a copyright may be liable for the copyright owner’s actual damages and any 
additional profits); 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2014) (stating that the infringer of a design patent may 
be “liable to the [patent] owner to the extent of his total profit”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2010) (providing restitution as a remedy for 
“misappropriation or infringement of another’s legally protected rights” in intellectual 
property).   
 25.  Whether the relief is characterized as equitable or legal is important to insurers 
because, as is discussed in Part III.C, insurers contend that equitable relief is simply not 
covered by liability policies.  Policyholders, and many courts, however, do not attach much 
importance to the label affixed to a monetary award when determining whether it is covered 
by insurance.   
 26.  See supra note 24. 
 27.  39 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Maine 1999). 
 28.  Id. at 67. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 67. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at 69. 
 33.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2014); id. at 68-69. 
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intended to “trade off Rand McNally’s goodwill” and for consumers to 
believe its TRIPMATE product was a Rand McNally product.34  For relief, 
Rand McNally requested a permanent injunction and the disgorgement of 
all profits DeLorme made from the sale of TRIPMATE.35  The case 
ultimately settled without a payment of any money from DeLorme to Rand 
McNally, but DeLorme nonetheless sought to recover its defense costs 
from its CGL insurer.36  Among the defenses to coverage the insurer 
asserted was the argument that the disgorgement of profits is not 
“damages” that are recoverable under CGL policies.37 
The DeLorme case is a typical case with respect to the issue of 
whether the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in intellectual property 
infringement cases is “damages” that are covered under CGL policies.  
Disgorgement of the infringer’s profits is a common type of relief sought in 
intellectual property infringement cases, particularly where the intellectual 
property holder would have a difficult time proving the amount of its own 
product it would have sold if the infringer had not been improperly selling 
the infringing product.38 
C. Shareholder Claims 
The nature of the claims and allegations in shareholder litigation 
generally is more uniform than in intellectual property infringement cases.  
Under state law, corporate managers owe their shareholders a duty of care 
and a duty of loyalty.39  In general, the duty of care requires that they 
exercise the care that “[an] ordinarily careful and prudent [man] would use 
in similar circumstances.”40  The duty of loyalty essentially prohibits them 
 
 34.  Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 
 35.  Id. at 69. 
 36.  Id. at 70. 
 37.  Id. at 78. 
 38.  See, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role 
of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
863, 881 (2002) (“Another express goal [of the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains] is to 
provide a measure of recovery for a trademark owner who is otherwise unable to prove 
actual damages . . . .”); Richard C. Wolfe & Serona Elton, Proving Disgorgement Damages 
in a Copyright Infringement Case is a Three-Act Play, 84 FLA. B.J. 26, 28 (2010) (“Because 
actual damages are often difficult to quantify with reasonable precision, infringement cases 
usually focus upon the other portion of this damage option, commonly referred to as 
disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.”). 
 39.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 25. See 
also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and 
duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the 
service of a corporation and its stockholders.”).  
 40.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 25 
(citations omitted).  See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 
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from self-dealing or acting when there are conflicts of interest.41 
Under federal securities laws—the Securities Act of 193342 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193443—corporate managers are liable for 
misrepresentations, such as providing false or misleading information, 
made in connection with the offering or sale of securities. 
Shareholder litigation against corporate managers includes direct and 
derivative state law corporate claims and federal securities claims.44  
Federal securities law claims are the most significant, with experts 
estimating that approximately 80% of shareholder claims litigated in 
federal court are federal securities class actions.45  Most shareholder class 
actions are 10b-5 cases46 brought under federal securities laws and 
approximately 94% of these 10b-5 claims are based upon alleged 
misrepresentations contained in financial statements.47 
More specifically, in shareholder class actions, current or former 
shareholders allege that misrepresentations contained in financial 
statements or in the company’s projections concerning future results 
induced the shareholders to trade.48  Shareholders then allege that they 
suffered losses when the market price for the security reverted to its “true” 
 
1984) (“The duty of care refers to the responsibility of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in 
the performance of his tasks, the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar situation 
would use under similar circumstances.”); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 
125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are 
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in 
similar circumstances.”). 
 41.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 25.  See 
also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“The rule that requires an undivided 
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty 
and self-interest.”). 
 42.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2014). 
 43.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78aa (2014). 
 44.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 27-
28 (explaining that derivative actions are cases where the suit is brought by a shareholder on 
behalf of the corporation itself.  Common examples of derivative suits are suits alleging 
excessive compensation or outright theft by a particular manager.  Derivative suits only 
comprise 14% of all fiduciary duty claims filed in 1999 and 2000).  Because of their relative 
scarcity, they are not the focus of the shareholder litigation addressed in this Article. 
 45.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 21 
(explaining that federal securities law claims are the most prevalent form of direct and 
derivative suit).  
 46.  Id., at 31 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 
(1975)) (explaining that Rule 10b-5 is the federal securities laws’ catch-all anti-fraud 
provision which proscribes fraudulent conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security”). 
 47.  Id., at 4, 31. (illustrating that in 2008, for example, 75% of securities class actions 
alleged violations of Rule 10b-5). 
 48.  Id. 
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underlying value.49  For relief, the shareholders seek the difference in price 
at which the trade would have occurred if not for the allegedly false 
information provided by the defendants.50  In order to recover, the plaintiffs 
must show, among other things, that the defendants acted with scienter in 
making a material misstatement upon which the plaintiffs relied, and that 
their reliance on the misstatement caused a loss.51  The scienter requirement 
generally can be satisfied by a showing of recklessness by the defendant, 
which means it was foreseeable that the statement could be misleading.52 
Because of the way losses are calculated in shareholder litigation (the 
number of outstanding shares are multiplied by the movement in the stock 
price caused by the alleged misconduct),53 defendants in shareholder 
litigation often face massive liabilities.  In recent years, the median amount 
of damages sought in all shareholder cases was approximately $340 
million54 with the median settlement being 2.7% of that amount.55  To 
protect themselves and their corporate managers against the costs 
associated with defending56 and settling potentially financially devastating 
shareholder cases, corporations buy D&O insurance, which, as discussed in 
Part II, is specifically intended to cover such losses.  Even with D&O 
insurance, however, almost all shareholder cases settle before going to trial 
because the policyholder does not want to risk an adverse verdict due to the 
potentially catastrophic amounts of the potential damage awards often 
sought in shareholder litigation (hundreds of millions or even billions of 
dollars in cases against large corporations), which routinely exceed the 
limits of the insurance purchased.57  In the absence of insurance, due to the 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 32 
(illustrating the scienter requirement of such cases). 
 52.  See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F. 3d 202, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(defining the concept of “foreseeability”); BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 32 (explaining that the key issues are what the reasonable 
investor would consider significant and foreseeable). 
 53.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 34 
(describing damages as the difference between the price the plaintiffs paid (or received) for 
their shares when they bought (or sold) them and the price they would have paid but for the 
defendants’ misrepresentations). 
 54.  Id., at 142. 
 55.  Id., at 8. 
 56.  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 135 
(explaining that the average defense costs in such cases are $3,042,159). 
 57.  See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 
162-65 (discussing the relationship between investor loss, potential damages and 
settlement); Christopher C. French, Segmented Settlements Are Not the Answer: A Response 
to Professor Squire’s Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of 
Shareholder Lawsuits, 7 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 589, 598 (2013) (discussing the consequences 
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enormous amounts at issue, the underlying plaintiffs’ claims against the 
individual corporate manager would go uncompensated in many, if not 
most, cases.58 
II. THE RELEVANT POLICY LANGUAGE 
Insurance policies, almost without exception, are lengthy, complex 
standard form contracts of adhesion drafted by insurers that are sold on a 
take-it-or leave-it basis with respect to the wording contained in them.59  
The fact that insurers drafted the language becomes important when the 
rules of policy interpretation are applied to the language.  The specific 
language that insurers have chosen to use with respect to the issue of 
whether their policies cover claims for restitution is discussed below. 
A. “Damages” Covered by Commercial General Liability Policies 
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies were first introduced in 
1941 and they provide the broadest form of liability coverage available.60  
 
of refusing to settle due to the  risk of being held liable for more than the policy limits); 
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 
and Securities Settlements, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755, 766-67, 793 (2009) (describing the role 
that the structure and size of a D&O policy along with the size of investor-loss play in 
deciding when and how to settle cases); Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Michael 
Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1064 (2006) (explaining that 
since 1980, only 37 of the thousands of securities fraud cases filed actually were tried to 
judgment). 
 58.  See supra note 4 (discussing the reasons why judgments against most people are 
uncollectible).  
 59.  See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 
4.06[b] at 4-37 (Aspen 2d ed. 1999) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of 
‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior 
to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested 
Language Defense, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1072, 1091 (2010) (describing the 
“hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in 
Insurance, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance 
companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); James M. 
Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?  Text 
versus Context, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard policy that 
is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet…. [T]here is 
little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that 
determines the scope of coverage.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized across 
insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain around.”). 
 60.  See, e.g., E. W. SAWYER, COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE, Chs. 2, 3 (1943) 
(describing the formation of the Insurance Services Office (“ISO”) as well as the original 
objectives of CGL insurance); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage: 
Asbestos Liability And Insurance After Three Decades Of Dispute, 12 Conn. Ins. L. J. 349, 
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The CGL policy form initially was created by the two insurance rating 
bureaus that eventually merged and became the Insurance Services Office, 
Inc. (“ISO”).61  Under the 2007 standard form version of the CGL policy, 
which remains one of the forms most commonly in use today, the basic 
insuring agreement language in the personal injury and advertising liability 
section is worded as follows: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of “personal and advertising 
injury” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right 
and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those 
damages . . . .62 
Notably, the term “damages” is undefined.   
“Personal and advertising injury” is defined as follows: 
Personal and advertising injury” means injury, including 
consequential “bodily injury”, arising out of one or more of the 
following offenses: 
a.  False arrest, detention or imprisonment; 
b.   Malicious prosecution; 
c.  The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or 
invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, 
dwelling or premises that a person occupies, 
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or 
lessor; 
d.  Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material 
that slanders or libels a person or organization or 
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, 
products or services; 
e.  Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material 
that violates a person’s right of privacy; 
f.  The use of another’s advertising idea in your 
 
355 (2006) (describing in detail the background and development of CGL policy). 
 61.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (explaining 
that ISO develops its own standard policy forms and makes them available to its member 
insurers which then adopt them and present them to state insurance regulators for approval).  
ISO is comprised of approximately 1400 property and casualty insurers and “is the almost 
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance.”  Id.  As a result, 
“most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.”  Id.; U.S. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that ISO is an 
influential organization within the insurance industry that promulgates standard form 
insurance policies, including CGL policies that insurers across the country use to conduct 
their business).  
 62.  Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., FORM NO. CG00011207, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE FORM (2007), reprinted in DONALD S. MALECKI, COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY, at App. J, p. 471 (9th ed. 2012). 
ARTICLE 1 (FRENCH) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:34 PM 
614 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
“advertisement”; or 
g.  Infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or 
slogan in your “advertisement”.63 
An “advertisement” is defined as: 
A notice that is broadcast or published to the general public for 
specific market segments about your goods, products or services 
for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For 
purposes of this definition:  a. notices that are published include 
material placed on the Internet or on similar electronic means of 
communication; and b. regarding web-sites, only that part of a 
web-site that is about your goods, products or services for the 
purposes of attracting customers or supporters is considered an 
advertisement.64 
Notably, along with several intentional torts, claims for misappropriation of 
an advertising idea and the infringement of a copyright, trade dress or 
slogan in an “advertisement” are expressly covered. 
B. “Losses” and “Damages” Covered by D&O Policies 
D&O policies were first sold in America by Lloyd’s of London in the 
1930s and other insurers began selling such insurance more widely in the 
1960s.65  D&O policies are intended to cover the corporate managers of a 
company and the company itself against claims that may be asserted 
against them related to corporate activities in order to protect their personal 
assets as well as the company’s assets.66  Nearly all public corporations 
purchase D&O policies.67 
The most common explanation for why D&O insurance is allowed 
and considered desirable is that companies would not be able to attract 
 
 63.  Id. at App. J, p. 479. 
 64.  Id., at 477. 
 65.  See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, 
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE §11.02 (1st ed. 1997 & 
Supp. 2015) (overview of the history and status of the D&O Insurance Market). 
 66.  See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 65, at §11.01; BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 45 (explaining the purpose of D&O policies). 
 67.  See, e.g., Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 Geo. L. J. 1795, 1797 (2007) 
(“U.S. publicly traded corporations – virtually all of them – protect themselves against the 
costs associated with corporate and securities law liability by purchasing D & O 
insurance.”); Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: 
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
487, 487 (2007) (“Nearly all public corporations purchase D&O policies.”); Tillinghast 
Towers Perrin, 2005 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, 20 fig. 21  (2006) (reporting 
that 100% of public companies that responded to the survey purchased D&O insurance). 
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talented people to run companies if corporate managers had to risk their 
own personal assets in order to do so.68  For similar reasons, many states, 
including Delaware where over 50% of all publicly traded corporations and 
over 63% of the Fortune 500 are incorporated,69 have passed statutes that 
allow companies to indemnify corporate managers for many types of 
misconduct and to purchase insurance to cover the losses they are allowed 
to indemnify as well as the ones they are unable to indemnify.70 
Although insurers use numerous D&O policy forms, like the CGL 
policy form, insurers are the drafters of all of them.71  The insuring 
agreement language in many standard form D&O policies is worded as 
follows: 
If during the policy period any claim or claims are made against 
the Insureds . . . for a Wrongful Act (as hereinafter defined) while 
acting in their individual or collective capacity as Directors or 
Officers, the Insurer will pay on behalf of the Insureds or any of 
them [100%] of all Loss (as hereinafter defined), which the 
Insureds or any of them shall become legally obligated to pay . . . 
.72 
The term “Wrongful Act” is often defined as follows: 
Any actual or alleged error or misstatement or misleading 
statement or act or neglect or breach of duty by the Insureds 
while acting in their individual or collective capacities, or 
any matter not excluded by the terms and conditions of this 
policy claimed against them solely by reason of their being 
Directors or Officers of the Company.73 
 
 
 68.  See, e.g., KALIS ET AL., supra note 65, at §11.01; BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 43-44 (explaining why D&O policies are 
allowed). 
 69.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 162-65; 
supra note 5, at 24. 
 70.  See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (allowing a corporation to eliminate or 
limit personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stock holder for monetary 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty, so long as it is not a breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty, was not done in bad faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation 
of the law); BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 43, 44 
(describing the Delaware statute as an example of state statutes that allow corporations to 
purchase and maintain D&O insurance even against those losses that the corporation cannot 
indemnify itself); KALIS ET AL., supra note 65, at §11.01 (explaining further the purpose of 
D&O policies); Kairis, supra note 9, at 4. 
 71.  See supra notes 55 and 57; Baker & Griffith, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, 
supra note 5, at 45. 
 72.  International Insurance Co. v. Alfred M. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1452 n.9 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
 73.  Id.  
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The term “Loss” is commonly defined as follows: 
Any amount which the Insureds are legally obligated to pay 
for a claim or claims made against them for Wrongful Acts, 
and shall include but not be limited to damages, judgments, 
settlements and costs, costs of investigation . . . and defense 
of legal actions, claims or proceedings and appeals 
therefrom, cost of attachment or similar bonds; providing 
always, however, such subject of loss shall not include fines 
or penalties imposed by law, or matters which may be 
deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this 
policy shall be construed.74 
As is the case with CGL policies, the term “damages” is not defined. 
III. A CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF WHETHER CLAIMS FOR 
RESTITUTION ARE COVERED UNDER LIABILITY POLICIES  
Insurance policies legally are considered contracts, and the 
interpretation of them is governed by two well-established rules of policy 
interpretation:  (1) contra proferentem and (2) the “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine.  As discussed below, when these rules are analyzed 
and applied to the issue of whether claims for restitution are covered under 
the terms of CGL and D&O policies, one can conclude that such relief is 
covered. 
A. Contra Proferentem 
It is Hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters of 
the policy language that uses the terms “damages” and “loss,”75 the doctrine 
of contra proferentem applies, which means the ambiguities in the policy 
language are construed against the insurers and in favor of coverage.76  The 
 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See supra notes 55, 57, 58, 67, 68 and 70. 
 76.  See, e.g., Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) 
(“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the 
insurer.”); See also Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) 
(“Since an insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if 
it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the insured, must suffer.”); See also RPM Pizza, Inc. v. 
Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 1366, 1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed 
against the insurance company and in favor of the reasonable construction that affords 
coverage.”); See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the 
controlling language will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other 
favorable to the insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.”); See also 
Gomolka v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Ohio 1982) (“Policies of 
insurance, which are in language selected by the insurer and which are reasonably open to 
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test under many states’ laws for determining whether policy language is 
ambiguous is whether the provisions at issue can reasonably be interpreted 
in different ways.77  If the policyholder and insurer both offer reasonable 
interpretations of the same policy language, then the policy language is 
ambiguous and it should be construed in favor of coverage.78  The question 
is not whether the insurer or the policyholder has the better interpretation, 
but rather, whether the policyholder’s interpretation is reasonable.79  Where 
the controversy involves a phrase that has generated numerous lawsuits 
with inconsistent results, common sense dictates that the policy language is 
ambiguous.80 
 
different interpretations, will be construed most favorably for the insured.”).   
 77.  See, e.g., 2 Eric M. Holmes & Mark S. Rhodes, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 6.1, at 
169 (2d ed. 1996) (indicating that insurer has burden of establishing that insurer’s 
interpretation is the only fair interpretation of contract); 2 Rowland H. Long, THE LAW OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 16.06, at 16-32 (Supp. 1988). See also New Castle Cnty. Del. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001) (“‘The settled test 
for ambiguity is whether the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of 
different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.’”) (quoting New 
Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 
1999)); See also High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 1994) (“If 
the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one 
interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer.”); See also Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 
139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy fairly supports an interpretation favorable to both the 
insured and the insurer, the policy should be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); See also 
Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (“The 
court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as 
the construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to 
be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”).   
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See, e.g., Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Investors Diversified Ltd., Inc., 407 So.2d 
314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company contends that the language is 
not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as proof of that pudding the fact that the 
Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans have arrived at opposite 
conclusions from a study of essentially the same language.”); See also Crawford v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan. 1989) (“Reported cases are in conflict, 
the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions and the justices of this 
court [disagree].  Under such circumstances, the clause is, by definition, ambiguous and 
must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all courts 
adopt a reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is 
susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to 
the situation at hand.”); See also George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
161 N.E. 276 (Ohio 1928) (“Where the language of a clause used in an insurance contract is 
such that courts of numerous jurisdictions have found it necessary to construe it and in such 
construction have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the correct meaning, intent and 
effect thereof, the question whether such clause is ambiguous ceases to be an open one.”); 
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In addition, because the terms “damages” and “loss” limit coverages 
that otherwise are provided, the terms should be treated as exclusionary 
language which means:  (i) they should be narrowly construed and (ii) the 
insurer has the burden of proving they eliminate or reduce coverage.81 
Further, it is well established that exclusionary language should not be 
interpreted or applied in such a way that the basic coverage provided under 
a policy becomes illusory because it is subsumed by the exclusion.82 
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine 
Another chestnut of the rules of insurance policy interpretation is that 
the policy should be interpreted in such a way as to fulfill the “reasonable 
expectations” of the policyholder.83  The seminal article regarding the 
 
See also Cohen v. Erie Indem, Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact 
that [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable 
conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) 
(indicating that the insurer has burden to prove the applicability of an exclusion as an 
affirmative defense); See also Continental Ins. Co. v. Louis Marx & Co., 415 N.E.2d 315, 
317 (Ohio 1980) (stating that defense has burden of proving defense based upon exclusion); 
See also Brown v. Snohomish Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 340 (Wash. 1993) 
(explaining that once insured has made a prima facie case that there is coverage, the burden 
shifts to the insurer to prove an exclusionary provision applies).  See also 13 John Alan 
Appleman And Jean Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7405 (2nd ed. 2011); 2 
Steven Plitt et al., Couch On Insurance, § 22:31 (3rd ed. 2015). 
 82.  See, e.g.,  Bowersox Truck Sales & Service, Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 
273, 277-78 (3rd Cir. 2000) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of policy’s two-year limitation 
period where interpretation would have rendered coverage illusory); See also Tews Funeral 
Home v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987) (policy excluding acts 
explicitly covered in prior section of policy construed against insurer); See also Harris v. 
Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting insurer’s 
interpretation of insured v. insured exclusion in policy because it “would render the 
coverage provided by the policy illusory”); See also Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 
179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398 (D. Del. 2002) (rejecting a D&O insurer’s interpretation of the 
policy’s deliberate fraud exclusion where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to 
that coverage”, because “[n]o insured would expect such limited coverage from a policy that 
purports to cover all types of securities fraud claims”); See also Titan Indem. Co. v. Newton, 
39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (finding coverage even though “the limitations 
of [the] policy completely swallow up the insuring provisions”); See also Atofina 
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 185 S.W.3d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 2005) (rejecting 
insurer’s interpretation of additional insured endorsement because it “would render coverage 
under the endorsement largely illusory”); See also Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 
1380 (Md. Ct. App. 1997) (“If the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision, the 
provisions are completely contradictory.  That is the grossest form of ambiguity.”).  
 83.  Roland v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A 
contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of 
coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); A.B.C. Builders, 
Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1995) (“[T]he policy language 
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“reasonable expectations” doctrine84 was written more than forty years ago 
by then Professor Robert Keeton.85  After subsequently becoming a judge, 
Judge Keeton summarized his version of the doctrine as follows: 
In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of 
applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the 
coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a careful 
examination of the policy provisions indicates that such 
expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the 
insurer.86 
 
must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the insured’s reasonable 
expectations.”); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495-96 
(W. Va. 1987) (indicating that the court will apply reasonable expectations doctrine to 
construe the policy in a manner that a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured 
would expect the language to mean, even though painstaking examination of the policy 
provisions would have negated those expectations) See, e.g., Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas 
R. Newman, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §1.03[b][2][B], at 42-53 (14th 
ed. 2008) (identifying courts in forty-two states that have expressed support for, or applied a 
form of, the reasonable expectations doctrine); Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, 
INSURANCE LAW, §§ 6.3(a)(3), at 633-34 (1988); LONG, supra note 77, § 16.07, at 16-39; 
Stempel, supra note 59, § 11.1, at 312 (1994).  See also AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 
P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (ambiguous coverage clauses of insurance policies are to be 
interpreted broadly to protect the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured).  
 84.  The reasonable expectations doctrine can find support in a number of contractual 
doctrines, but it largely is based upon the fact that insurance policies generally are contracts 
of adhesion drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  See, 
e.g., Friedrick Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); Daniel Schwarcz, A Product Liability 
Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 
1394, 1401-02 (2007); Peter Swisher, Symposium Introduction: The Insurance Law 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations after Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (1998).  
 85.  Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
 86.  Keeton & Widiss, supra note 83, § 6.3(a)3, at 633.  For commentary and criticisms 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine including discussions of the various iterations of it, 
see Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 1395 (criticizing the reasonable expectations doctrine and 
arguing that the case law endorsing the doctrine is “confused and inconsistent”); Roger C. 
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and 
asserting that the doctrine is principled and can be applied within justifiable guidelines); 
Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998) (discussing the doctrine as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. 
Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 
287-96 (1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, 
Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for 
refinements to the doctrine in response to the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts 
and commentators and contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to 
speak the platitudes of reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic 
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Stated differently, under Judge Keeton’s version of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine, “even when the policy language unambiguously 
precludes coverage, under certain circumstances, courts will hold that 
coverage exists.”87  In short, the policyholder receives the coverage that it 
reasonably expected it would receive when it bought the policy even if 
there is some policy language or exclusion that credibly can be argued 
defeats coverage when a claim is presented. 
C. Application of the Rules of Policy Interpretation to the Issue 
When these rules of policy interpretation are applied to the terms of 
standard form CGL88 and D&O89 policies, one can conclude that claims for 
restitution are covered. 
1. Analysis under CGL Policies 
Under CGL policies, the insurer agrees to pay all “damages” that the 
policyholder becomes legally obligated to pay.90  It is sometimes argued 
that “damages” do not include equitable forms of relief.91  Yet, as 
previously noted, the term “damages” is undefined.  Thus, under the 
 
analysis”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable 
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 
181, 182-83, 191 (1998) (describing the various judicial approaches to the doctrine and 
noting both liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that have adopted the 
doctrine).  
 87.  Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 22 (1997). 
 88.  The conclusion that the term “damages” includes claims for restitution is not meant 
to suggest that all claims for intellectual property infringement are covered under CGL 
policies.  The policyholder must prove the claim falls within the coverage granted in the 
insuring agreement of the CGL policy at issue and CGL policies contain a number of 
exclusions, such as the “Knowing Violation of Right of Another” and “Unauthorized Use of 
Another’s Name or Product” exclusions, that may be applicable depending upon the facts of 
each individual case.  See, e.g., MALECKI, supra note 62, at App. J, p. 471-72 (reproducing 
the exclusions to the personal and advertising injury liability coverage provisions). 
 89.  Again, the conclusion that covered “losses” includes claims for restitution is not 
meant to suggest that all claims in shareholder litigation are covered under D&O policies.  
D&O policies contain a number of exclusions, such as the “Insured Versus Insured,” 
“Fraud/Dishonesty,” “Personal Profit,” and “Return of Remuneration” exclusions, which 
may be applicable depending upon the facts of the case at issue.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. 
Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 
337, 352-57 (2012). 
 90.  See supra note 62.   
 91.  See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 
1188-89 (3d Cir. 1991); Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 257 
Cal. Rptr. 621, 628 (Cal. App. 1989).   
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doctrine of contra proferentem if there is any ambiguity regarding whether 
the relief sought or paid to the underlying plaintiffs constitutes “damages,” 
then the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of coverage.92 
Arguably, one does not even need to rely upon contra proferentem to 
reach the conclusion that claims for restitution can constitute “damages” as 
the term is commonly used and understood.  Black’s Law Dictionary, for 
example, defines “damages” as follows: 
Money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as 
compensation for loss or injury . . . .  Damages are the sum of 
money which a person wronged is entitled to receive from the 
wrongdoer as compensation for the wrong.93 
Similarly, a Random House dictionary defines “damages” as “the 
estimated money equivalent for detriment or injury sustained” or as “cost; 
expense; charge.”94  In the same vein, a Webster’s dictionary defines 
“damages” as “the money claimed by, or ordered paid to, a person to 
compensate for injury or loss caused by the wrong of the opposite party or 
parties.”95 
Under these definitions, the only question is whether the policyholder 
is required to pay money to the claimant.96  Thus, regardless of whether the 
payments are based upon a legal or equitable theory of relief, monetary 
payments by a defendant to a plaintiff are “damages” as the term is 
commonly understood and defined. 
The term “damages” also has been interpreted by many courts broadly 
to include a variety of forms of relief.97  For example, the scope of the term 
“damages” was extensively litigated in environmental liability cases after 
the passage of CERCLA98 in 1980 in cases where the policyholder agreed 
 
 92.  See supra Part II.   
 93.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
 94.  THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at 365 (Unabridged 
ed. 1973). 
 95.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, at 373 (5th ed. 2014).  Insurance 
dictionaries similarly define “damages” without distinguishing between equitable and non-
equitable relief.  See, e.g., DAVIDS, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE, at 85 (6th rev. ed. 1983) 
(“The estimated reparation in money for injury sustained.”); GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE 
TERMS, at 65 (5th ed. 1994) (“the amount required to pay for a loss”); RUBIN, BARRON’S 
DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS, at 71 (1987) (“Sum the insurance company is legally 
obligated to pay an insured for losses incurred.”) 
 96.  If the disgorged money were not paid to the plaintiff, but instead were paid to the 
court, for example, then a much stronger argument could be made that the payment is not 
“damages” as the term is used in liability insurance policies.  Of course, in the absence of 
the prospect of actually receiving a monetary award, most plaintiffs would not pursue 
litigation. 
 97.  See, e.g., KALIS ET AL, supra note 65, at § 5.03.   
 98.  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 
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in a settlement, or was ordered by a court, to investigate and remediate 
environmental contamination as a result of a claim being asserted against 
the policyholder by a governmental agency.  Many courts held the 
investigation and remediation costs not yet incurred by the policyholder 
constituted damages even though no money was actually paid by the 
policyholder to the government.99 
The courts that reached that conclusion did so for a variety of reasons.  
Many courts noted that the common understanding of the word “damages” 
does not distinguish between legal and equitable claims.100  Consequently, 
such courts refused to apply a “technical, arcane approach in discerning the 
meaning of damages.”101  Other courts considered the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder and determined that policyholders 
reasonably could expect a broad reading of the term “damages.”102 
According to one court, “[i]t would come as an unexpected, if not 
incomprehensible, shock to the policyholders to discover that their 
insurance coverage was being denied because the plaintiff chose to frame 
his complaint in equity rather than in law.”103  Still other courts noted that 
remediation costs are the equivalent of traditional compensatory damages 
because “cleanup costs ‘are essentially compensatory damages for injury to 
[government] property.’”104 
In intellectual property infringement cases, courts similarly have 
concluded that the relief sought by the plaintiffs is “damages” under CGL 
policies.105  For example, in trademark infringement cases, even though one 
 
42 U.S.C. §9601, et seq. 
 99.  KALIS ET AL, supra note 65, at §5.03 (concluding: (i) 18 of the 19 state supreme 
courts that have addressed the issue have held environmental remediation costs constitute 
“damages” and (ii) numerous federal appellate courts have reached the same conclusion).   
 100.  Id. (citing New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 
1188-89 (3d Cir. 1991); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 511 (Wash. 
1990)). 
 101.  Id. (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 
1991)).   
 102.  Id. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 583 
(Mass. 1990)); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990)). 
 103.  Id. (quoting Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 257 Cal. 
Rptr. 621, 628 (Cal. App. 1989)).   
 104.  Id. (quoting A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 
622-23 (Iowa 1991)) (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. 
Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich. 1988)); see also, e.g., Independent Petrochemical Corp.  v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 
(1992); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253, 
1277 (Cal. 1990). 
 105.  See, e.g., School Union No. 37 v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the term “money damages” in a liability policy includes amounts required to be 
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of the principal forms of statutory relief available to the trademark holder is 
the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits,106 numerous courts have 
concluded that such relief constitutes “damages” under CGL policies.107 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Limelight Productions, Inc. v. 
Limelite Studios, Inc.,108is representative of courts’ analysis regarding the 
issue.  In finding in favor of coverage, the court stated: 
We find no merit to the argument that ill-gotten profits are not 
damages covered by the insurance policies . . . .  Congress 
authorizes plaintiffs to recover these ill-gotten profits as the 
presumed equivalent of plaintiff’s own lost profits . . . .  That is, 
while Lanham specifies the plaintiff may recover its actual 
damages in addition to the defendant’s ill-gotten profits, this 
Circuit recognizes ill-gotten profits as merely another form of 
damages that the statute permits to be presumed because of the 
proof unavailability in these actions.  When [the insurers] issued 
these policies they knew of the Lanham Act, were on notice 
plaintiffs could recover ill-gotten profits, and must be held to 
have intended to cover these damages because they did not 
exclude them.  Applying Florida law to construe the policy, we 
interpret “damages” broadly in favor of the insureds because [the 
insurers] wrote the policies, selected that term, and chose not to 
define or restrict it . . . .  We refuse to allow [the insurers] to deny 
coverage for the very injury they took payment to insure against.  
Such amounts clearly are covered by the policies issued.109 
The term “damages” also has been interpreted to include the 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains under professional liability policies.110  In 
 
reimbursed to the claimants); Limelight Productions, Inc. v. Limelite Studios, Inc., 60 F.3d 
767 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that award of ill-gotten profits and punitive damages for 
trademark infringement covered under a CGL policy because the undefined term “damages” 
should be interpreted broadly and the policy did not expressly exclude coverage for ill-
gotten profits); Looney Ricks Kiss Architects, Inc. v. Bryan, 2014 WL 931781 (W.D. La. 
March 10, 2014) (citing Limelight and holding that the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits in 
a copyright infringement action are “damages”); American Employers’ Insurance Co. v. 
DeLorme Publishing Co., Inc., 39 F.Supp.2d 64 (D. Maine 1999) (explaining that 
disgorgement of profits in a trademark infringement case are recoverable damages under 
CGL policy); International Communication Materials, Inc. v. Employer’s Ins. of Wausau, 
1996 WL 1044552 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that disgorgement of profits in trademark 
infringement case is covered under a CGL policy because the term “damages” is undefined 
in policy and an award of disgorged profits is a type of damages); In re Estate of Mark F. 
Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234 (D.C. App. 1998) (indicating that disgorgement of ill-gotten gains 
constituted covered “damages” under a professional liability policy). 
 106.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (a)(1).   
 107.  See supra note 105. 
 108.  60 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 1995).   
 109.  Id. at 769 (citations omitted).   
 110.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234 (D.C. App. 1998); School Union 
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In re Estate of Corriea,111 for example, an attorney represented the parties 
on both sides of a transaction and was sued for breach of his fiduciary 
duties.112  After a bench trial, the attorney, who had died prior to trial, was 
found liable and was ordered to disgorge the profits he had made in 
connection with the transaction.113  Because the deceased attorney’s estate 
did not have sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, the claimants sought 
to recover under the attorney’s professional liability policy.114  The policy 
provided that, “the Company shall pay on behalf of the insured in excess of 
the deductible all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as Damages . . . .”115 
Unlike in typical CGL policies and D&O policies, the term “damages” 
was actually defined in the professional liability policy at issue: 
[A]ny amount which the insured is legally obligated to pay for 
any Claim to which this insurance applies and shall include 
judgments and settlements:  provided always that Damages shall 
not include fines or penalties imposed by law or by other matters 
which may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to 
which this policy shall be construed.116 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the 
insurer’s argument that the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains was not 
“damages”: 
[F]ailure to order disgorgement in lieu of unproven damages 
would “leave [the claimant] without a remedy” and “also gut 
fiduciary law.”  We decline to hold such restitution “uninsurable” 
under the District’s law and therefore beyond the coverage 
provided by the [insurance] policy . . . .  ‘Damages’ in common 
usage means the reparation in money for a detriment or injury 
sustained.  The reasonably prudent layperson does not cut nice 
distinctions between the remedies offered at law and in 
equity.”117 
In sum, courts have interpreted the term “damages” broadly in a 
variety of contexts to encompass numerous types of relief sought by 
 
No. 37 v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that the term “money 
damages” in an Educator’s Liability policy includes tuition amounts a school union agreed 
to reimburse a student).   
 111.  719 A.2d 1234 (D.C. App. 1998).   
 112.  Id. at 1236-37.   
 113.  Id. at 1237.   
 114.  Id. at 1235.   
 115.  Id. at 1237.   
 116.  Id. at 1237-38. 
 117.  Id. at 1241 (quoting Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 
1032-33 (Md. 1993)).   
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plaintiffs, including monetary payments and equitable relief.  
Consequently, the argument that a claim for restitution is not seeking 
“damages” under the terms of CGL policies has been rejected in many 
jurisdictions. 
2. Analysis under D&O Policies 
The analysis is similar under D&O policies.  Under D&O policies, the 
term “loss” is broadly defined and includes “damages,” which again is 
undefined:  “any amount which the Insureds are legally obligated to pay for 
a claim or claims made against them for Wrongful Acts, and shall include 
but not be limited to damages, judgments, settlements and costs, costs of 
investigation . . . and defense of legal actions, claims or proceedings and 
appeals therefrom . . . .”118  Consequently, in cases where the defendant 
actually pays money to the plaintiffs, the conclusion that the payment is 
covered by D&O policies can also be reached regardless of whether the 
payment is based upon a calculation of the value of the plaintiffs’ injuries 
or is the disgorgement of the defendants’ ill-gotten gains.  For the insurance 
coverage analysis, it simply is not relevant whether the money paid is 
characterized as an ill-gotten gain or something else.119 
Many courts have recognized that the term “loss” has been broadly 
defined and includes settlements and judgments even where the payments 
can be viewed as restitution in the form of the disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains.120  In International Ins. Co. v. Johns,121 for example, shareholders 
 
 118.  See supra note 74. 
 119.  Indeed, because shareholder cases almost always settle, there usually are no 
findings of fact regarding the basis for the amounts paid to the plaintiffs so the policyholders 
and insurers typically can only characterize the payments as either for restitution or 
compensation in coverage disputes.  See supra note 51. 
 120.  See, e.g., William Beaumont Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 552 F. App’x 494, 498-500 
(6th Cir. 2014) (wages withheld from nurses in a class action antitrust action were covered 
“losses” because the money allegedly was illegally retained as opposed to illegally 
obtained); Va. Mason Med. Ctr. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 331 F. App’x. 473 (9th Cir. 
2009) (affirming trial court opinion that allowed insurance recovery for settlement amount 
that constituted the return of monies allegedly charged improperly to the underlying 
claimants); Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1989) (portion of 
monies paid to executives under golden parachutes that was returned to shareholders under a 
settlement agreement was a covered “loss” under D&O policy); U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. 
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-3175 PAM/JSM, 2014 WL 3012969, at *1, *3-5 (D. 
Minn. July 3, 2014) (rejecting insurer’s argument that $55 million settlement of class 
actions to recover bank overdraft fees were not covered under D&O policies because such 
amounts represented the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains that were uninsurable as a matter 
of law); Classic Distrib. & Beverage Grp., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. CV 
11-07075 GAF RZX, 2012 WL 3860597, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) (rejecting 
insurer’s argument that the portion of the amounts paid under a settlement agreement in a 
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filed a derivative action against the directors of a company due to the 
directors’ adoption of golden parachutes for themselves.122  The directors 
settled the case by agreeing to return $600,000 paid to them under the 
golden parachutes with no admission of liability.123  The directors then 
sought to recover the settlement amount from their D&O insurer.124  The 
insurer refused to pay, contending the settlement payment was not a “loss” 
and instead constituted the return of “illegal profits.”125 
The policy at issue defined “loss” as follows: 
The term ‘Loss’ shall mean any amount which the Insureds are 
legally obligated to pay for a claim or claims made against them 
for Wrongful Acts, and shall include but not be limited to 
damages, judgments, settlements and costs, costs of 
 
class action related to employees’ unreimbursed work expenses were not covered “losses” 
under an Employment Practices Liability policy because such amounts allegedly were 
restitutionary), vacated because of settlement, No. CV 11-07075 GAF RZX, 2012 WL 
5834570 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012); Acacia Research Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, No. SACV 05-501 PSG MLGX, 2008 WL 4179206, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2008) (payment of royalties under a settlement agreement in a patent infringement case was 
a covered “loss” under D&O policy where the policyholder did not admit liability); Alstrin 
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398-401 (D. Del. 2002) (in light of the 
fact D&O policies are intended to cover securities fraud claims, disgorgement is covered 
unless the conduct at issue is illegal); Liss v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. A-6863-03T5, 2006 WL 
2844468, at *4-7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (rejects Level 3 and a public policy 
argument that restitutionary damages are not covered “losses” under D&O policies); J.P. 
Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076, 1082-83 (N.Y. 2013) (policyholder 
that agreed to pay $160 million in “disgorgement” to settle claims relating to the willful 
violation of securities laws by allowing its clients to trade mutual funds after hours were 
covered “losses” because most of the “disgorged” profits were the policyholder’s clients’, 
not the policyholder’s); Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR International Business Ins. Co., SE, No. 
05 CVS 5564, 2007 WL 4480057, at *17 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2007) (settlement 
payment made in securities fraud case based upon misrepresentations associated with the 
underwriting of bonds are covered “losses” under professional liability policy because 
coverage provided by the policy would be illusory otherwise).  See also 23 ERIC M. 
HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 146.5[B] (Lexis Nexis 1996), Lexis 
(explaining various court decisions explaining court decisions on the issue); 3 NEW 
APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 22.05[10] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015), 
Lexis (same). 
 121.  874 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1989).  
 122.  Id. at 1450. Golden parachutes are essentially termination agreements providing 
“substantial bonuses and other benefits for managers and certain directors upon a change in 
control of a company.”  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 178 n. 5 (Del. 1986); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 4 n. 2 
(1985) (explaining that the term golden parachutes generally refers “to agreements between 
a corporation and its top officers which guarantee those officers continued employment, 
payment of a lump sum, or other benefits in the event of a change of corporate ownership”).  
 123.  Int’l Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1452. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 1454-55. 
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investigation . . . and defense of legal actions, claims or 
proceedings and appeals therefrom, cost of attachment or similar 
bonds; providing always, however, such subject of loss shall not 
include fines or penalties imposed by law, or matters which may 
be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this 
policy shall be construed.126 
In rejecting the insurer’s argument and holding the settlement payment 
was a covered “loss” under the policy, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
The policy defines “loss” as any amount that the insureds are 
legally obligated to pay for claims of “wrongful acts,” including 
settlements . . . .  In settling the derivative action, the directors 
became legally obligated to pay a sum to reconcile allegations of 
breaches of fiduciary duties.  Under the ordinary and popular 
meaning of the language defining loss, therefore, the $600,000 
that settled the claims . . . is a loss.127 
Similarly, in 2013, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest state 
court in New York, unanimously rejected insurers’ attempts to avoid 
coverage for a settlement that included the “disgorgement” of ill-gotten 
gains.128  In J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., the policyholder, a 
broker-dealer, was accused of improperly facilitating “late trading” by 
certain of its customers in violation of federal securities laws.129  The SEC 
concluded the violations were willful, and the policyholder agreed to pay a 
$90 million civil penalty and $160 million in “disgorgement.”130  When the 
claim was presented to the insurers, they denied coverage, arguing that the 
disgorgement payment was uninsurable as a matter of law because it was 
against public policy to allow insurance to cover such payments.131  The 
New York Court of Appeals rejected this argument because it was 
irrefutable that the definition of “loss” in the policies at issue covered the 
payment, and the “disgorged” profits largely benefited the policyholder’s 
clients, not the policyholder.132  Thus, public policy concerns about 
allowing insurance to cover illicit gains were not really implicated by the 
settlement despite (1) the “disgorgement” label attached to the settlement 
payment and (2) the finding that the policyholder’s misconduct was 
willful.133 
 
 126.  Id. at 1452 n.9 (ellipses in original). 
 127.  Id. at 1454.  
 128.  J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 992 N.E.2d 1076 (N.Y. 2013). 
 129.  992 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (N.Y. 2013). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1080. 
 132.  Id. at 1080-82. 
 133.  Id. at 1082-83 (noting that a finding of a “willful” violation by the SEC did not did 
not demonstrate the requisite finding of intent to cause harm to implicate the public policy 
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In addition to the New York Court of Appeals and the Eleventh 
Circuit, numerous other courts similarly have held that claims for 
restitution such as the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains are covered “losses” 
and “damages.”134 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Public Policy Arguments Against Allowing Insurance to Cover 
Claims for Restitution 
As the above analysis reveals, the argument that claims for restitution, 
such as the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, are not covered by liability 
policies is not firmly grounded in the policy language.  Instead, the stronger 
argument is premised upon the public policy that “one may not insure 
against the risk of being ordered to return money or property that has been 
wrongfully acquired.”135  The underlying public policy rationale is as 
follows: 
When the law requires a wrongdoer to disgorge money or 
property acquired through a violation of the law, to permit the 
wrongdoer to transfer the cost of disgorgement to an insurer 
would eliminate the incentive for obeying the law.  Otherwise, 
the wrongdoer would retain the proceeds of his illegal acts, 
merely shifting his loss to an insurer.136 
In short, the argument is that if insurance were allowed to cover a 
claim for restitution such as the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, then the 
wrongdoer (i.e., the policyholder) would not be punished or deterred from 
acting improperly.137  Indeed, according to this argument, if insurance were 
 
exception for intentional injury). 
 134.  See sources cited supra notes 105 and 120. 
 135.  Bank of the W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992). 
 136.  Id. at 555. 
 137.  Notably, the public policy arguments against allowing insurance to cover claims 
seeking restitution – e.g., that a policyholder would be unjustly enriched if insurance were 
allowed to cover restitution such as the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains – are inapplicable to 
defense costs.  Unlike the situation where a policyholder is required to return an ill-gotten 
gain taken from a claimant and thus insurance arguably should not be permitted to pay the 
“refund” because the bad actor effectively would be retaining the ill-gotten gain in such a 
situation, the costs a policyholder incurs to defend itself have not been “taken” from anyone.  
If an insurer reimburses its policyholder’s defense costs, the insurer is not paying the 
policyholder’s liabilities to the claimants such that the policyholder could be viewed as 
being allowed to keep “stolen” or improperly obtained money.  Nor would a policyholder be 
incentivized to “steal” other people’s money if its insurance were allowed to cover the 
defense costs the policyholder incurs defending itself.  Stated differently, if the 
policyholder’s defense costs are paid by an insurer, then the policyholder is placed in a 
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allowed to cover the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, then the policyholder 
basically would be allowed to keep the money it “stole” because the insurer 
would be the party actually paying it back to the underlying claimants. 
Several courts have endorsed this argument.138  The leading case is the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Level 3 Communications, Inc. v. Federal 
Insurance Company.139 
1. The Level 3 Case 
In Level 3, the directors and officers of a company were sued by the 
shareholders of a company they acquired based upon allegations that the 
directors and officers made fraudulent representations that induced the 
prior owners to sell the company for less than it was worth.140  For relief, 
the prior owners were seeking an award of the difference between the value 
 
revenue neutral position.  The policyholder does not gain anything from its allegedly 
improper conduct, but it also does not suffer financially in defending the claims against it. 
Thus, the resolution of the issue of whether defense costs should be covered by insurance in 
securities cases or intellectual property infringement cases, where the claimants are seeking 
restitution, does not invite the public policy debate that accompanies a discussion of whether 
indemnification for such relief should be allowed.   
 138.  See, e.g., Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 909-12 (7th Cir. 
2001) (finding that restitution provided under settlement agreement in a securities fraud case 
was not covered under D&O policy); O’Neill Investigations, Inc. v. Ill. Emp’rs Ins. of 
Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1981) (holding that claims seeking injunctive relief and the 
restoration of monies wrongfully acquired are not covered under liability policy); Bank of 
the W., 833 P.2d at 553 (stating that it is against public policy to allow insurance to cover 
the return of monies wrongfully obtained); Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. American Cas. Co., 
426 A.2d 94, 96-97 (Pa. 1981) (holding that taxes unlawfully collected and then returned are 
not insurable losses); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams’ Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 
504 P.2d.1139, 1143 (Wash. 1973) (finding that the Attorney General’s complaint seeking 
injunctive relief to enjoin unfair business practices was not a claim for “damages”); Local 
705 Int’l Bhd of Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. Five Star Managers, L.L.C., 735 
N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that return of monies improperly received is 
not an insurable “loss”); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 528, 
528-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that disgorgement of ill-gotten gains are not covered 
“damages” or “losses”).  See also 23 ERIC M. HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 
2D § 146.5[B] (Lexis Nexis 1996), Lexis (explaining various court decisions explaining 
court decisions on the issue); 3 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 22.05[10] 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015), Lexis (same). 
 139.  272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 140.  Level 3, 272 F.3d at 909-10.  Despite its apparent significance, the Level 3 decision 
thus far has prompted only limited commentary by the scholarly legal community.  See, e.g., 
Eric W. Collins, Note, Level 3 v. Federal Insurance: Do You Know What Is In Your 
Directors And Officers Liability Insurance Policy?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 199, 210 (2004) 
(noting that the decision may render the coverage provided by D&O policies illusory); 
Richard F. Haus, On the Level 3: Reviewing The (Un)Insurability Of Restitutionary 
Payments, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 165 (2006) (an attorney whose law firm 
represents insurers discusses the holding in Level 3 with approval). 
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of their shares at the time of the sale and the value of the shares at the time 
of trial.141  The allegations and the relief sought in the case were fairly 
standard for securities fraud cases.142  Also typical of shareholder actions, 
the case settled for $11.8 million without an admission of liability or 
fault.143 
An insurer had issued a D&O policy to the directors and officers of 
the acquiring company that covered, among other things, “losses” incurred 
in securities cases, but the insurer refused to pay the settlement.144  “Loss” 
was defined in the policy as “the total amount which any Insured Person 
becomes legally obligated to pay . . . including, but not limited to . . . 
settlements.”145  The insurer contended that the relief sought in the case, 
and ultimately required to be paid under the settlement agreement, was 
“restitutionary in nature” and therefore, it (1) was not really a “loss” and 
(2) was against public policy to allow insurance to cover such relief.146 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the insurer.147  In 
explaining its decision, the court stated: 
[The relief sought] is standard damages relief in a securities-fraud 
case.  But it is restitutionary in character.  It seeks to divest the 
defendant of the present value of the property obtained by fraud, 
minus the cost to the defendant of obtaining the property.  In 
other words, it seeks to deprive the defendant of the net benefit of 
the unlawful act, the value of the unlawfully obtained stock 
minus the cost to the defendant of obtaining the stock.  It is 
equivalent to seeking to impress a constructive trust on the 
property in favor of the rightful owner.  How the claim or 
judgment order or settlement is worded is irrelevant.  An insured 
incurs no loss within the meaning of the insurance contract by 
being compelled to return property that it had stolen, even if a 
more polite word than “stolen” is used to characterize the claim 
for the property’s return.148 
The policyholder countered that the primary purpose of D&O 
insurance is to protect directors and officers against securities fraud claims 
and that the directors and officers had not been found liable for anything or 
been ordered to disgorge any ill-gotten gains because they had settled the 
 
 141.  Id. at 910. 
 142.  Id. at 911. 
 143.  Id. at 909. 
 144.  Id. (ellipses in original). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 909-10. 
 147.  Id. at 911. 
 148.  Id. at 910-11. 
ARTICLE 1 (FRENCH) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:34 PM 
2016] THE INSURABILITY OF CLAIMS FOR RESTITUTION 631 
 
case.149  The Seventh Circuit dismissed such reasoning, stating: 
That [argument] can’t be right . . . .  It would mean, as [the 
policyholder’s] lawyer confirmed at argument, that if [the 
policyholder], seeing the handwriting on the wall, had agreed to 
pay the plaintiffs in the fraud suit all they were asking for (a very 
large amount-almost $70 million), which they surely would not 
have done had there been no evidence of fraud (no rational 
defendant settles a nuisance suit for the full amount demanded in 
the complaint, unless the amount is trivial), [the insurer] would 
still be obligated to reimburse [the policyholder] for that amount.  
And that would enable [the policyholder] to retain the profit it 
had made from a fraud.150 
The legal analysis in the Level 3 decision is subject to significant 
criticism.  First, as also noted by another legal scholar, the Seventh Circuit 
used provocative language such as “thief” and “stolen” to describe the 
policyholder and the amount paid to settle the claims even though it is 
standard business practice in the corporate world for companies to acquire 
other companies in exchange for stock and to do so for as little as 
possible.151  The fact that an acquired company may actually be worth more 
than the purchase price does not mean the buyer “stole” the company.  
Nonetheless, under the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, any deal that turns 
out to be unfavorable for one of the parties could be characterized as a form 
of theft. 
Second, the Seventh Circuit essentially held the policyholder would 
have to prove its conduct was not fraudulent in order to recover under a 
D&O policy even though the policyholder settled without an admission of 
liability or fault.152  Such a holding is simply wrong from a legal 
perspective because insurers bear the burden of proving that the conduct at 
issue falls within an exclusion that precludes coverage.153 
Third, in order to make an insurance coverage determination, a court 
is supposed to evaluate only:  1) the allegations in the underlying complaint 
 
 149.  Id. at 911. 
 150.  Id. at 911 (citing Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 188 
A.D.2d 47, 55 (NY App. Div. 1993) (“[D]etermination of this appeal should not hinge on 
the circumstance that [the policyholder] made restitution by way of settlement instead of in 
satisfaction of a judgment after trial.”)). 
 151.  See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, § 19.04[B] (3d ed. 
2012) (discussing the harsh language used in the Level 3 decision). 
 152.  See Level 3, 272 F.3d at 911-12 (noting that the policyholder “has made no attempt 
to show that the fraud suit was groundless and the settlement merely an effort to avoid the 
expense of defending a nuisance suit”). 
 153.  See supra note 81 (showing that an insurer has the burden of proof regarding an 
exclusionary clause as a defense). 
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(for the duty to defend) and the findings of fact (for indemnity if the case is 
tried), 2) the relevant policy language, 3) the purpose of the insurance, and 
4) the rules of policy interpretation.154  The court should not be evaluating 
whether the amount of the settlement was a “nuisance” value settlement or 
an implicit admission of wrongdoing.155  Thus, the Seventh Circuit erred in 
Level 3 by analyzing whether, in the court’s judgment, the settlement was 
fair to the underlying claimants or was an implicit admission of 
wrongdoing. 
Fourth, when the Level 3 decision is closely analyzed, one will note 
that the Seventh Circuit spent very little time actually discussing or 
analyzing:  (1) the actual policy language at issue, which did not expressly 
exclude coverage for claims for restitution or (2) whether the insurer agreed 
to provide the coverage for the claims at issue under the terms of the policy 
in exchange for a premium.156  In fact, the underlying claims at issue in 
Level 3 were fairly routine security law claims for which corporate 
managers specifically purchase D&O coverage and for which insurers 
readily accept premiums.157 
Finally, insurers do not need the judicial activism evidenced in the 
Level 3 decision in order to avoid liability for claims for restitution because 
insurers draft the language contained in policies and they can and do 
 
 154.  See, e.g., supra Parts II and III (discussing the relevant policy language and rules of 
policy interpretation). See also Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 
294, 299 (Colo. 2003) (“Initially, we must revisit the distinction between an insurance 
company’s duty to defend its insured, and its duty to indemnify.  The duty to defend 
concerns an ‘insurance company’s duty to affirmatively defend its insured against pending 
claims.’  We have long held that to determine whether a duty to defend exists, courts must 
look no further than the four corners of the underlying complaint (the ‘four corners’ or 
‘complaint’ rule).  An insurer is not excused from this duty ‘unless there is no factual or 
legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held liable to indemnify the insured.’  
Hence, if the alleged facts even potentially trigger coverage under the policy, the insurer is 
bound to provide a defense.”) (citations omitted); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport 
Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 (Pa. 2010) (“The question of whether a claim against an insured 
is potentially covered is answered by comparing the four corners of the insurance contract to 
the four corners of the complaint . . . . An insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend a 
claim against its insured unless it is clear from an examination of the allegations in the 
complaint and the language of the policy that the claim does not potentially come within the 
coverage of the policy . . . . In making this determination, the ‘factual allegations of the 
underlying complaint against the insured are to be taken as true and liberally construed in 
favor of the insured . . . .’ Indeed, the duty to defend is not limited to meritorious actions; it 
even extends to actions that are ‘groundless, false, or fraudulent’ as long as there exists the 
possibility that the allegations implicate coverage.”) (citations omitted).  
 155.  STEMPEL, supra note 151, § 19.04[B] (criticizing the factual judgments made in the 
Level 3 decision). 
 156.  Level 3, 272 F.3d at 909-10. 
 157.  See supra Part C (shareholder claims for restitution). See also STEMPEL, supra note 
151, § 19.04[B] (noting that the losses in this case are viewed as “common”). 
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expressly exclude coverage for such relief when they desire to do so.158  In 
short, because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion drafted by 
sophisticated insurers, the Seventh Circuit should have interpreted and 
applied the terms of the policy subject to the rules of policy interpretation 
instead of substituting its own view of justice. 
2. The Bank of the West Case 
One of the principal cases the Seventh Circuit cited and relied upon in 
Level 3 to support its decision was Bank of the West v. Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County.159  In Bank of the West, the policyholder, a bank, 
developed a program to finance automobile premiums for customers to be 
paid in installments.160  The policyholder used insurance agents to sell the 
program to customers.161  Under the program, the insurance agents obtained 
the customers’ power of attorney and applied for loans to pay the premiums 
in the customers’ names.162  Many customers were unaware that the agents 
had agreed to loans in the customers names and that the loans were in fact 
made.163  The customers were also unaware of the terms of the loans, which 
had interest rates over 126%, substantial fees and penalties, and did not 
allow for unilateral cancellation by the customer.164 
 
 158.  See supra Part II (discussing relevant policy language). See also STEMPEL, supra 
note 151, § 19.04[B] (questioning whether the insurers in Level 3 needed judicial activism).  
Some D&O policies do contain express exclusions for claims for restitution so it is 
irrefutable that insurers know how to draft policy language to exclude such claims.  See, 
e.g., McCostis v. Home Ins. Co. of Ind., 31 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1994) (the definition of 
the term “damages” in the policy expressly excluded coverage for “the return of or 
restitution of legal fees, costs and expenses”); Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., Civ. A. 93-0254-
LFO, 1994 WL 35865 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 1994) aff’d and remanded, 68 F.3d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 
1995); Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 89, at 349 (the term “loss” is defined in 
some policies “to exclude such things as disgorgement, restitution, taxes, fines and 
penalties”).  Notably, if policyholders are aware of the existence of such exclusions, 
however, then insurers that have added such exclusions to their policies may be at a 
competitive disadvantage to insurers that do not contain such exclusions in their policies 
when attempting to sell their policies, as D&O insurers discovered when they tried to 
impose corporate governance requirements on policyholders in exchange for lower 
premiums or as a condition to selling them policies.  See Baker & Griffith, The Missing 
Monitor, supra note 67, at 1808-12 (describing empirical research that showed the D&O 
insurers were mostly unable to cause any business practice changes regarding corporate 
governance concerns, including an example of a D&O insurer that was forced to drop a loss 
prevention program in response to a decline in business). 
 159.  Level 3, 272 F.3d at 909.  
 160.  Bank of the W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Cal. 1992). 
 161.  Id. at 548. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
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A consumer class action was filed against the policyholder where the 
class claimants sought “restitution . . . of any and all amounts collected by 
defendants through their unlawful and unfair business practices . . . .”165  
The policyholder ultimately settled the case by agreeing to make changes to 
the program and by paying the class claimants $500,000.166 
When the claim was tendered to the policyholder’s CGL insurer, the 
insurer denied coverage on the basis, among other things, that the policy 
did not cover claims for restitution.167  The policy provided, “[the insurer] 
will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages . . . ,” and the term “damages” was 
undefined.168  Thus, the question that ultimately was presented to the 
California Supreme Court was whether the $500,000 payment required 
under the settlement agreement was “damages.” 
The California Superior Court held the settlement payment was 
neither “damages” nor insurable, reasoning as follows: 
It is well established that one may not insure against the risk of 
being ordered to return money or property that has been 
wrongfully acquired.  Such orders do not award “damages” as 
that term is used in insurance policies . . . .  If insurance coverage 
were available for monetary awards [for unfair business 
practices], a person found to have violated the act would simply 
shift the loss to his insurer and, in effect, retain the proceeds of 
his unlawful conduct.  Such a result would be inconsistent with 
the act’s deterrent purpose.  As we have previously explained, 
“‘[t]o permit the [retention of even] a portion of the illicit profits, 
would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is 
essential if adequate enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved.  
One requirement of such enforcement is a basic policy that those 
who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits 
flowing therefrom.’”169 
The court further explained the public policy behind its holding: 
When the law requires a wrongdoer to disgorge money or 
property acquired through a violation of the law, to permit the 
wrongdoer to transfer the cost of disgorgement to an insurer 
would eliminate the incentive for obeying the law.  Otherwise, 
the wrongdoer would retain the proceeds of his illegal acts, 
 
 165.  Id. (ellipses in original). 
 166.  Id. at 548-49. 
 167.  Id. at 549. 
 168.  Id. at 550 (alterations in original omitted).  
 169.  Id. at 553-54 (some alterations in original) (citing Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 
591 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1979) and quoting SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259-
60 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
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merely shifting his loss to an insurer.170 
Unlike the Level 3 decision, the Bank of the West decision is based 
upon something more than the court’s own sense of justice or public policy.  
In particular, the California Supreme Court based its decision largely upon 
the legislative intent behind the Unfair Business Practices Act that gave rise 
to the claims against the policyholder at issue: 
The section [of the statute at issue] also authorizes courts to make 
such orders as “may be necessary to restore to any person in 
interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have 
been acquired by means of such unfair competition.”  The 
purpose of such orders is “to deter future violations of the unfair 
trade practice statute and to foreclose retention by the violator of 
its ill-gotten gains.”  The Legislature considered this purpose so 
important that it authorized courts to order restitution without 
individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury if 
necessary to prevent the use or employment of an unfair 
practice.171 
Thus, unlike the Seventh Circuit in Level 3, the court did not create law 
based upon its own views of public policy, but rather, relied upon the 
legislature’s pronouncements in that regard. 
Nonetheless, the court’s analysis of whether the undefined term 
“damages” that is contained in CGL policies covers claims for restitution is 
based solely upon public policy arguments and California law rather than 
the rules of policy interpretation and the common definitions of the term 
“damages.”  As discussed in Part III, any award or settlement that requires 
the payment of money to a claimant constitutes “damages” for insurance 
purposes.  As noted by numerous other courts, policyholders do not make 
fine legal distinctions between claims seeking monetary restitution and 
claims seeking only money when they purchase insurance to cover claims 
asserted against them.172  Also, under the reasoning in Bank of the West, 
insurance coverage would not be allowed in many breach of contract 
claims where the plaintiff is not seeking restitution but rather only a money 
award because the claims asserted in breach of contract cases typically are 
predicated upon the idea that the breaching party has wrongfully acquired 
money or property from the non-breaching party. 
Despite these analytical problems, several courts in other jurisdictions 
have employed reasoning similar to the Level 3 and Bank of the West 
 
 170.  Id. at 555 (citations omitted). 
 171.  Id. at 553 (citations omitted) (quoting Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d at 
55). 
 172.  See supra note 105 (discussing how “damages” has been interpreted broadly to 
include legal and equitable forms of relief). 
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decisions and have held it would be against public policy to allow 
insurance to cover claims for relief that could be characterized as seeking 
restitution.173 
B. Public Policy Arguments in Favor of Allowing Insurance to Cover 
Claims for Restitution 
1. The Theoretical Foundation of the Public Policy against Allowing 
Insurance to Cover Claims for Restitution is Unsound 
The soundness of the theoretical foundation underlying the public 
policy against allowing insurance to cover claims for restitution is 
questionable.  Moral hazard,174 the basic insurance law theory underlying 
the Level 3 and Bank of the West decisions, posits that policyholders would 
be encouraged to engage in misconduct if claims for restitution were 
allowed to be covered by insurance because policyholders would have little 
or no incentive not to engage in misconduct if the injuries caused by their 
bad behavior were covered.175  Courts often apply this logic in the first 
party insurance context such in situations where a court rejects a 
beneficiary’s attempt to recover under a life insurance policy where the 
beneficiary murdered the insured person.176  Similarly, if the policyholder 
 
 173.  See supra note 138 (discussing why courts have rejected claims that insurance 
policies should pay damages for money wrongfully obtained by the policyholder). 
 174.  See supra note 6 (defining the concept of moral hazard).   
 175.  Of course, a moral hazard argument can be made against allowing insurance to 
cover all types of claims, which is that the presence of insurance lessens the financial impact 
of the loss or liability so people are encouraged to take less care to avoid losses and 
accidents due to the presence of insurance.  See supra note 6.  Nonetheless, despite such 
moral hazard concerns, insurance is still allowed to cover countless perils and types of 
liabilities due to the important risk transference and risk management role that insurance 
plays and the importance of compensating innocent victims.  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1489 (2010). 
 176.  See, e.g., New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 605 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(citing “the accepted rule that a life insurance policy is void ab initio when it is shown that 
the beneficiary thereof procured the policy with a present intention to murder the insured”); 
Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Assn. v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1966) (a 
beneficiary cannot recover life insurance proceeds if he murders the insured); 1B JOHN A. 
APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, at 481 (1981) (“It has 
uniformly been held that a beneficiary under a contract of personal insurance who murders 
the insured cannot recover the policy benefits.”); Christopher C. French, Debunking the 
Myth that Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or 
Damages, 8 Hastings Bus. L. J. 65, 93 (2012) (“The basic theory, known as the “moral 
hazard” problem, posits that the policyholder is encouraged to engage in bad behavior 
because the policyholder would either be rewarded for bad behavior by being able to 
recover under insurance policies for the damage he causes to his own property . . .”).   
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intentionally destroyed the property by arson, then courts often will not 
require an insurer to cover the amount of a property loss.177  Such decisions 
make sense in the first party context because the policyholder’s conduct is 
tantamount to insurance fraud and often is criminal. 
Yet, when examined, the suggestion that a policyholder would be 
deterred from engaging in illegal conduct if liability insurance were not 
available to compensate injured parties is suspect.  In fact, there is scant 
empirical evidence to support the argument that a primary deterrent to 
corporate manager misconduct at the center of shareholder litigation is the 
unavailability of insurance to cover the injuries caused by such conduct.178  
Indeed, in many instances, there are substantial deterrents to convince 
corporate managers not to engage in criminal behavior that are unrelated to 
insurance.  For example, shareholder fraud is a felony.179  One would 
expect that imprisonment would be a better deterrent to corporate 
misconduct than the forfeiture of insurance proceeds.180 
In addition, what empirical evidence exists that a corporate manager 
actually possesses a copy of the company’s D&O insurance policy, reviews 
it to determine whether the insurance will cover the potential shareholder 
claims that could be asserted, and then engages in the improper conduct 
 
 177.  See, e.g., 12 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE, at 7031 (“Arson by the insured will prevent him from recovering.”); JERRY & 
RICHMOND, supra note 6, at 422-23.  See also Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 100 N.E. 942, 
944 (Ill. 1913) (“A fire insurance policy issued to any one, which purported to insure his 
property against his own willful and intentional burning of the same, would manifestly be 
condemned by all courts as contrary to a sound public policy. . . .”), quoted in U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1988).  One commentator 
refers to this as the “‘barn burning’ defense,” stating “the insured who intentionally burns 
his own barn is not entitled to collect the insurance on it!”  WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS 
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, §1:13, at 48-49 (6th Ed. 1990). 
 178.  See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc. 509 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987) (“The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against 
liability under Title VII will encourage violations of the Act is . . . speculative and 
erroneous.”); French, Debunking the Myth, supra note 176, at 97 (discussing the lack of 
empirical evidence to support the argument that intentional misconduct would be deterred 
by the lack of insurance to cover the liabilities that arise from such misconduct). 
 179.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (2002) (authorizing prison sentences of as high as 25 
years under Sarbanes-Oxley for misrepresentations regarding securities). 
 180.  Of course, the fact very few people responsible for the financial collapse of 2008 
have been prosecuted undermines the deterrent effect of imprisonment for corporate 
misconduct.  See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad? Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Not 
Guilty as Not Charged, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1089 (2014); Jed S. Rakoff, Peter J. Henning, 
Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 91 (2012); The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, The New York Review of Books (April 3, 2014); Gretchen Morgenson and 
Louise Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figure, N.Y. Times (April 14, 
2011). 
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because the manager is confident that she can do so with financial 
impunity?  In short, such arguments are based upon theory, not evidence. 
Further, if punishment for and deterrence of corporate misconduct 
were really overriding public policies that would be diluted by allowing 
insurance to cover claims for restitution, then why do most states have laws 
that expressly allow corporations:  1) to indemnify their corporate 
managers against claims for personal misconduct and 2) to purchase 
insurance to cover the liabilities arising from such misconduct?181  The 
most persuasive source of public policy – statutes – suggests that society 
has determined that punishing and deterring corporate misconduct are not 
the most important public policies when it comes to corporate management 
and governance.  If punishment for and deterrence of corporate misconduct 
were the overriding public policies, then the legislation that has been 
passed across the country that insulates corporate managers from financial 
liability for their misconduct would not exist.  And, of course, one would 
expect widespread criminal prosecution of corporate managers who violate 
securities laws, but that has not happened in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis.182  Consequently, the argument that the overriding public policy 
prohibits liability insurance from covering claims for restitution rings 
hollow. 
2. Competing Public Policies that Weigh in Favor of Allowing 
Insurance to Cover Claims for Restitution 
On the other hand, there are several competing public policies that 
favor allowing insurance recoveries for claims seeking restitution such as 
the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.  For example, public policy favors 
compensating innocent victims.183  Many, if not most, injured people would 
 
 181.  See supra note 70. 
 182.  See supra note 180. 
 183.  See, e.g., Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (N.D. Okla. 2010) 
(compensating a wrongdoer’s innocent victims outweighs the concern that the wrongdoer 
would unjustly benefit); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 163-
64 (E. D. Va. 1993) (where insurance policy does not explicitly exclude coverage of 
intentional acts, public policy of compensating innocent victims outweighs public policy of 
not permitting coverage of intentional action); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 
720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (Arizona public policy favors compensating injured 
persons); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Conn. 
1992) (public policy does not prohibit indemnity for compensatory damages flowing from 
dentist’s intentional sexual assault of patient); Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 
1168, 1170-71 (Del. 1990) (refusing to void coverage for intentional wrongdoing under an 
automobile policy because of the competing public policy behind the state motor vehicle 
financial responsibility law); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 
539 (Iowa 2002) (“Compensating [the policyholder’s] innocent victims [of fraud] — the 
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go uncompensated for their injuries in the absence of insurance because 
bad actors, whether corporate managers or other tortfeasors, often do not 
have sufficient assets to adequately compensate the people they injure.184  
Indeed, in the context of shareholder litigation where the plaintiffs often 
seek to recover hundreds of millions or billions of dollars from corporate 
managers, despite the exceptionally high compensation of corporate 
managers today, most of them simply do not have sufficient personal assets 
to cover the settlements (or judgments in the few cases tried) in such 
cases.185  Thus, because the victims often would go uncompensated in the 
absence of D&O insurance, providing the victims a source of funds from 
which their losses can be paid is an important public policy that weighs in 
favor of allowing insurance to cover claims for restitution. 
Another competing public policy that favors allowing insurance to 
cover claims for restitution is the public policy that favors the enforcement 
of contracts, including insurance policies, in accordance with their terms.  
As one court has noted, when it comes to insurance, there are numerous 
competing public policies:  “One such policy is that an insurance company 
which accepts a premium for covering all liability for damages should 
honor its obligation.”186  Insurers draft the language contained in their 
 
Steckels — outweighs the concern that [the policyholder] will unjustly benefit from 
coverage.”); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) 
(allowing insurance recovery for a physician’s sexual assault of his patient because “[i]t is 
not the insured who will benefit, but the innocent victim who will be provided compensation 
for her injuries”); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul & Marine Ins. Co., 495 
N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. Ct. Ap.) (victims of doctor’s sexual abuse can be compensated 
through doctor’s professional liability policy) (citing Ranger, 549 So.2d at 1010 n.1 
(Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting)), review granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 30, 
1993); S.S. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 808 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) 
(concluding that a homeowner’s insurance policy provides coverage for the transmission of 
a sexually transmitted disease by relying on the analogous context of automobile insurance 
in which public policy favors the compensation of tort victims).   
 184.  See supra note 4. 
 185.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT, supra note 5, at 142. 
 186.  Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So.2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987).  
Accord School Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848 (6th 
Cir. 1990), reh’g denied, 921 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1990) (public policy favors enforcing the 
terms of insurance policies and “common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating 
insurance costs and the trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable 
punitive damages, would normally neutralize any stimulative tendency that insurance might 
have.”); Royal Oak 912 F.2d at 849 (“Public policy normally favors enforcement of 
insurance contracts according to their terms.”) (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, 
Inc., 549 So.2d 1005, 1010 n.1 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting); Northwestern Natl. 
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the 
public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not lightly to 
be interfered with.  It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as against public 
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policies so they do not need courts to resort to public policy arguments to 
help them avoid coverage for the types of claims that they do not want to 
insure.  Insurers can simply state, in clear terms, the specific types of 
claims that are not covered under the policy.187  Indeed, as previously 
noted, some D&O policies do expressly exclude coverage for claims for 
restitution.188  Thus, if an insurer does not want to cover claims for 
restitution, but fails to make that clear in the policies it sells, then public 
policy favors enforcing the terms of the policy by requiring the insurer to 
honor the deal for which it accepted premiums. 
Instead of asking courts to strike down the agreements they have 
drafted and entered, insurers should exercise their considerable insurance 
policy drafting powers to discourage undesirable behavior by their 
policyholders by expressly excluding coverage for such claims.189  Indeed, 
several courts have recognized this point and commented that insurance 
companies have ample ability, at the policy drafting stage, to prevent 
policyholders from being shielded from liability for intentional 
misconduct.190 
 
policy.”); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 
868 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1993) (noting that it is questionable whether the inference that 
insurance stimulates wrongdoing can overcome the “competing public policies . . . that 
favor freedom of contract and the enforcement of insurance contracts according to their 
terms”). 
 187.  Creech, 516 So.2d at 1174. 
 188.  See supra note 158.  
 189.  See, e.g., Ranger, 509 So.2d at 948 (“The marketplace itself will discourage 
wrongful acts of discrimination.”); Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Royal 
Oak, 912 F.2d at 848); Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012) (analyzing insurers’ 
ability to regulate policyholders’ conduct as a substitute for government regulation). 
 190.  See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (“Had the company wished to exclude 
coverage for intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have 
said so.”); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) 
(“Continental and other insurers which have issued policies containing such clauses have 
not up to now conceived that they were violating public policy by writing insurance policies 
insuring against losses resulting from discriminatory employment practices.”); Ranger, 509 
So.2d at 947 (citing Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68); University of Ill. v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The insurer is an informed contracting 
party with no inferiority in bargaining position and should not be allowed to escape from the 
contract it freely entered into . . . . This court will not rewrite . . . [the] policy to create an 
exclusion.”), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992); Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 
868 (“The carrier is, of course, free to expressly provide an exclusion for such conduct in 
the future.”).  
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3. Insurance Is Already Allowed to Cover Numerous Types of 
Intentional Torts 
Another fact that weighs heavily in favor of allowing insurance to 
cover claims for restitution is the fact that, despite public policy concerns to 
the contrary, many intentional injuries or damages caused by a policyholder 
are already allowed to be expressly covered under liability policies sold by 
insurers.191  In other words, insurers have been accepting premiums for and 
paying claims against their policyholders for liabilities due to intentional 
misconduct for decades.192  For example, under the Personal and 
Advertising Injury Liability Section of the 2007 standard form CGL policy 
form quoted above in Part II.A, coverage for intentional torts such as 
malicious prosecution,193 wrongful eviction,194 defamation,195 libel,196 
 
 191.  See supra Part II.A; French, Debunking the Myth, supra note 176. 
 192.  French, Debunking the Myth, supra note 176, at 67-69. 
 193.  See, e.g., Global NAPs, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing that the purchased insurance policy covered malicious prosecution); Atl. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Datacom, 139 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the 
insurance policy covered malicious prosecution, but noting that malicious prosecution under 
Georgia law is limited to the pursuit of criminal actions); City of Erie v. Guar. Nat’l Ins. 
Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (the duty to defend in a malicious 
prosecution matter is triggered when first criminal charges were filed); Lincoln Nat’l Health 
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 782 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (where policy 
specifically includes malicious prosecution as a covered claim, provision limiting coverage 
to unintentional acts does not apply); Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 
P.3d 809, 814 (Wash. 2000) (concluding that coverage for malicious prosecution does not 
violate public policy).  
 194.  See, e.g., Century Sur. Co. v. Seductions, LLC, 349 Fed. Appx. 455, 459 (11th Cir. 
2009) (recognizing insurance coverage for wrongful eviction, but noting split in authority 
regarding the necessity of possessory interest to assert claim); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. BSA Ltd. 
P’ship, 602 F. Supp. 2d 641, 651 (D. Md. 2009) (coverage defining personal and advertising 
injury included wrongful eviction); Westfield Ins. Group v. J.P.’s Wharf, Ltd., 859 A.2d 
74,77 (Del. 2004) (recognizing insurance coverage for wrongful eviction, but not finding 
coverage because the plaintiffs did not have a possessory interest); Dixon Distrib. Co. v. 
Hanover Ins.Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ill. 1994) (umbrella policy covered wrongful 
eviction); Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, 814 A.2d. 572, 574 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“[C]overage for the wrongful eviction may exist if there is a sufficient connection between 
the wrongful eviction and . . . the operation of, or operations incidental to, the designated 
premises.”). 
 195.  See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. North Vermillion Comm. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 630, 
635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (duty to defend arose from claims alleging slander and libel); 
Cmty. TV Corp. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 15 Mass. L. Rep. 435 *4 (Mass. Super. 2002) 
(although the insured did not expressly allege defamation as a cause of action, a duty to 
defend arose where alleged facts constituted defamatory act); McCormack Baron Mgmt. 
Services Inc. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. 1999) (recognizing 
in defamation case that so long as “the complaint merely alleges facts that give rise to a 
claim potentially within the policy’s coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend”); Town of 
Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.E.2d 167, 171-72 (N.Y. 2002) 
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slander,197 disparagement,198 and invasion of privacy199 are all expressly 
provided. 
There is little question that most, if not all, of these types of torts are 
often committed intentionally by policyholders.  Indeed, is it even possible 
to unintentionally prosecute someone maliciously?  The “malicious” 
qualification in the phrase “malicious prosecution,” by definition, means 
there was an improper intent.  Similarly, can someone wrongfully evict 
someone unintentionally?  It is hard to imagine unintentionally or 
unknowingly evicting someone.  When an individual disparages another, is 
it typically done unintentionally?  Coverage for all of these intentional torts 
and many more are expressly provided under the standard form language in 
CGL policies and courts routinely require insurers to pay such claims.200 
Similarly, insurance is also available to cover improper employment 
practices despite the fact that many such claims arise due to intentionally 
 
(finding the insurer had a duty do defend in defamation case); Butts v. Royal Vendors, Inc., 
504 S.E. 2d 911, 916 (W. Va. 1998) (finding a duty to defend in a defamation case where 
elements in complaint were “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the claim may 
be covered by the terms of the insurance policies”). 
 196.  See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. North Vermillion Comm. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 630, 
635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (duty to defend arose from claims alleging slander and libel). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See, e.g., Microtec Research v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 972 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that an insurance policy provided coverage for disparagement and 
comparing defamation to disparagement by noting that “[disparagement] is more akin to 
unfair competition than to true libel”); Lime Tree Village Cmty. Club Ass’n v. State Farm 
Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (duty to defend triggered by allegations 
in complaint that policyholder had falsely and maliciously slandered or disparaged 
homeowners’ titles); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 269 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“Whether characterized as a trade libel or product disparagement, an injurious 
falsehood directed at the organization or products, goods, or services of another falls within 
the coverage of the [policy].”); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Phelan, 799 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ill. App. 
2003) (upholding insurance coverage where defendant’s statements were specific to 
plaintiff, they misled, and they tended to influence the consuming public not to buy 
plaintiffs’ services).  
 199.  See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Auto. Network, Inc., 401 
F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no support in policy for limiting the interpretation of 
the term “invasion of privacy” and ordinary, lay definitions must be apply); Lineberry v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 885 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (insurer cannot 
escape explicit coverage for invasion of privacy by reference to exclusion for injuries that 
were intended or expected); Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 698 So.2d 618 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1997); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1376, 1384-85 (Md. 1997) 
(intentional tort of invasion of privacy covered despite “expected or intended” exclusion); 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.E. 2d 127 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1986) (duty to defend claim which “potentially” or “arguably” would fall under 
coverage for invasion of privacy). 
 200.  See Part II.   
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improper employment practices.201  In addition to being able to recover 
under CGL and D&O policies for certain types of improper employment 
practices claims, since the early 1990s employment practices liability 
insurance has been available.202  Employment practices liability insurance 
specifically provides coverage for many intentional and improper 
employment practices such as racial discrimination, wrongful termination, 
sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge.203 
The Sixth Circuit’s consideration of insurance for intentional 
employment discrimination in School District for Royal Oak v. Continental 
Casualty Co.204 is instructive in this regard.  In Royal Oak, the insured 
school board settled an intentional religious discrimination suit brought by 
an aggrieved teacher and then sought indemnification for that settlement 
under a CGL policy.205  The policy covered “‘all loss’ that the school 
district or its employees become legally obligated to pay . . . provided that 
the subject of the loss does not include ‘matters which shall be deemed 
uninsurable under state law.’”206 
The district court in Royal Oak held that the policy covered the school 
district’s liability for its intentional discrimination.207  The insurer invoked 
both the policy exclusion for “matters that are uninsurable under state law” 
and the public policy argument that Michigan public policy allegedly 
precluded enforcement of the coverage.208  Citing cases in which Michigan 
courts found coverage for a psychiatrist’s liability for “felonious sexual 
activity,” the district court held that, “‘Michigan does not as a general rule 
bar recovery under public liability policies simply because some illegal act 
was involved in the damage.’”209 
 
 201.  See French, Debunking the Myth, supra note 176, at 89. 
 202.  For various commentators’ thoughts regarding issues related to insurance coverage 
for wrongful employment practices and a discussion of the case law in that area, see Richard 
A. Bales and Julie McGhahy, Insuring Title VII Violations, 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 71 (2002); 
Whitney L. Elzen, Workplace Violence: Vicarious Liability and Negligence Theories as a 
Two-Fisted Approach to Employer Liability.  Is Louisiana Clinging to an Outmoded 
Theory?, 62 LA. L. REV. 897 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judge-Made Insurance That Was 
Not on the Menu: Schmidt v. Smith and the Confluence of Text, Expectation, and Public 
Policy in the Realm of Employment Practices Liability, 21 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 283 
(1999); Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1997); Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful 
Employment Practices, 48 OKLA. REV. 1 (1995).  
 203.  Id.  
 204.  912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 205.  Id. at 845-46. 
 206.  Id. at 846. 
 207.  Id. at 849-50. 
 208.  Id. at 847-48. 
 209.  Id. at 849 (quoting Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 83 N.W.2d 434, 436 
(Mich. 1957)). 
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed.  As an initial matter, the court questioned 
the assumption that insurance for intentional discrimination promotes 
wrongdoing:  “[p]erhaps the existence of liability insurance might 
occasionally ‘stimulate’ discrimination, but common sense suggests that 
the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the trauma of litigation . . . 
would normally neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might 
have.”210 
The Sixth Circuit then noted that “public policy normally favors 
enforcement of insurance contracts according to their terms.”211  The court 
further reasoned that the insurer is responsible for drafting the policy, not 
the policyholder or the court.  Thus, the insurer is in the best position to 
eliminate coverage for claims it does not want to insure.212  On this point, 
the Sixth Circuit quoted the District Court, which noted that, “‘insurers can 
always exclude or limit coverage’” for discrimination.213  Finally, the Sixth 
Circuit stated, “had the company wished to exclude coverage for 
intentional . . . discrimination in employment, it could and should have said 
so.”214 
Thus, if public policy allows insurance to cover claims for numerous 
intentional torts and employment discrimination, then one would expect 
that public policy also would allow insurance to cover claims for 
restitution. 
4. Insurance Already Is Allowed to Cover Punitive Damages 
Finally, the public policy arguments against allowing insurance to 
cover claims for restitution are quite similar to the public policy arguments 
against allowing insurance to cover punitive damages, which also have 
been rejected in most jurisdictions.  Under the terms of many standard form 
liability policies, punitive damages are covered because liability policies 
typically cover all “damages” for which the policyholder is liable without 
 
 210.  Id. at 848.  See also Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So.2d 945, 948 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“[W]rongdoers can be adequately punished under present law by 
the imposition of punitive damages, where appropriate, since it is against the public policy 
of this state to insure against such damages.”), revd., 549 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); Ranger, 
509 So.2d at 947 (“The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect 
against liability under Title VII will encourage violations of the Act is . . . speculative and 
erroneous.”) (quoting Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. 
Ga. 1978)); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 867 
(Minn. Ct. App.) (quoting Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848), review granted, No. 92-1625, 1993 
Minn. LEXIS 225 (Mar. 30, 1993). 
 211.  912 F.2d at 849 (citing Ranger, 549 So.2d at 1010 n.1 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting)). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. (quoting the transcript of the proceedings in the district court). 
 214.  912 F.2d at 849. 
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distinguishing between compensatory damages and punitive damages.215  
Yet, when it comes to actually paying punitive damages claims, insurers 
often argue it would be against public policy to do so because awards of 
punitive damages are often predicated upon egregious misconduct that 
should be deterred and punished without insurance undermining such 
goals.216  To remove the inconsistency between the policy language and 
insurers’ public policy position when punitive damage claims are actually 
tendered for payment, ISO proposed that punitive damages be expressly 
excluded from coverage under standard form liability policies in 1977.217  
Notwithstanding their litigation position and public policy 
pronouncements, however, insurers rejected the proposal because they 
concluded that doing so would impede their ability to market such 
insurance.218 
 
 215.  Standard form commercial general liability policies, for example, state that the 
insurer agrees to pay “all sums” the policyholder is “legally obligated to pay as damages” 
without limiting the covered damages to only compensatory damages.  See MALECKI, supra 
note 62, at App. J, p. 470 (defining damages under insurance policy). See also Tom Baker, 
Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101, 115 (1998) (“The 
agreements do not distinguish among kinds of damages . . . . Indeed, there is little dispute 
that, on their face, most primary general and automobile policies provide coverage for 
punitive damages.”).   
 216.  See, e.g., Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348, 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); St. Paul 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 777 P.2d 1259, 1269 (Kan. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983, 990-92 
(Mass. 1990); Heartland Stores, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 815 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991); Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 932 (N.Y. 1990).  The 
inconsistency of insurers asking courts to enforce the terms of their policies strictly when it 
comes to interpreting the scope of coverage under the insuring agreement and exclusions 
while simultaneously asking them to ignore the broad meaning of terms such as “damages” 
on public policy grounds when doing so is to their advantage has not been lost on insurance 
law scholars.  See, e.g., Baker, Reconsidering Insurance, supra note 215, at 124, n. 78 (“It 
takes some familiarity with insurance practice to fully appreciate the irony of insurance 
companies relying upon public policy arguments to avoid paying claims otherwise covered 
by their policies.  The irony comes from the steadfast complaints of insurance interests 
about judges who ‘rewrite’ insurance policies to provide coverage that the insurance 
companies did not sell.  According to the same logic, a judge who refused to enforce an 
insurance company’s promise to pay a punitive damages claim would be ‘rewriting’ the 
policy to take away coverage that the policyholder bought.”). 
 217.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION, at 106-07 (5th ed. 
2010) (noting that ISO’s attempt to introduce a punitive damages exclusion was met with 
protest); Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages? Discerning 
Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, 
Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L. REV. 455, 488 (1994) 
(acknowledging that ISO’s attempt to eliminate coverage for punitive damages was rejected 
by the insurance industry). 
 218.  Baker, Reconsidering Insurance, supra note 215, at 122 (stating that the insurance 
industry chose to not exclude coverage for punitive damages because such efforts were met 
with hostility by the industry as a whole and rejected on marketing grounds). 
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Not surprisingly, when addressing the issue of whether insurers should 
be permitted to draft policies that cover all types of damages including 
punitive damages, collect premiums from policyholders for such insurance, 
and then turn around and argue it is against public policy to provide such 
coverage when a claim arises, the majority of courts have held that 
policyholders can recover from their insurers for punitive damages awarded 
against them unless such damages are expressly excluded from coverage.219  
In addition, even in jurisdictions where courts have held that allowing 
insurance to cover punitive damages would be against public policy, most 
of them still allow insurance to cover punitive damages if the punitive 
damages are awarded on the basis of vicarious liability.220 
In short, if public policy concerns regarding insurance’s impact on the 
goals of deterring and punishing egregious misconduct that results in the 
award of punitive damages have been considered and rejected by courts 
across the country, then one could conclude that similar public policy 
concerns regarding the impact that  allowing insurance to cover claims for 
restitution would have on the goals of deterrence and punishment of 
intentional misconduct are not sufficient to override insurers’ contractual 
commitment to cover such claims. 
5. State Legislatures Have Concluded Claims for Restitution Should 
Be Insurable 
Finally, when analyzing courts’ efforts to determine the prevailing 
“public policy” in the context of whether insurance should be allowed to 
cover claims for restitution, on what basis do courts have authority to 
decide public policy?  One answer is the insurance policy language 
commonly found in the policies themselves, which provide the policies do 
 
 219.  See, e.g., KALIS ET AL, supra note 65, at §5.04 (“Courts in most jurisdictions have 
held that coverage for even directly assessed punitive damages may be available unless the 
policy at issue specifically excludes coverage for punitive damages . . .”; George L. Priest, 
Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1989) (discussing cases in 
which coverage for punitive damages was allowed in failed suicide attempts where the 
motor vehicle involved caused injuries to others); Catherine M. Sharkey, Calabresi’s The 
Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law and Scholarship: Revisiting the Non-
Insurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005) (discussing the various approaches 
courts have taken to determine whether punitive damages awards should be covered by 
insurance). 
 220.  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 6, at 525-26 (arguing that the imposition 
of punitive damages for vicarious liability has a less compelling public policy argument); 
KALIS ET AL, supra note 65, at §5.04; Michael A. Rosenshouse, Annotation, Liability 
Insurance Coverage as Extending for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 
(1982) (listing the various approaches taken by different states). 
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not cover claims that are uninsurable as a matter of law.221  Under the 
reasonable expectations doctrine and contra proferentem, however, such 
language should not be construed to give courts blanket authority to decide 
whether claims should be covered under the policies simply as a matter of 
public policy because it would create too much uncertainty at the time the 
policy is purchased regarding what types of claims are actually covered.  If 
the obligations of the insurer are unpredictable under the policy when it is 
purchased, then one of the central purposes of contracts and contract law—
that the parties’ obligations will be predictable—would be vitiated.222 
A second, and perhaps better, source for courts’ authority is the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Under the Restatement, a contract or 
term is unenforceable when public policy considerations clearly outweigh 
the interest of enforcement.223  Thus, the Restatement provides courts the 
authority to decide what is needed to protect the public welfare.224 
The Restatement provides courts with one central guiding principle in 
discerning public policy.  Specifically, a contract term is unenforceable “if 
legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”225  In other words, before 
attempting to discern public policy from other sources, courts should first 
look at legislation to determine whether the public’s duly elected 
legislature, which purports to represent the public’s will, has spoken on the 
issue. 
 
 221.  See, e.g., Reliance Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., 188 A.D.2d 47, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (the D&O policy excluded coverage for 
“matters which may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy 
shall be construed”); McCalla Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 WL 
1745647 (D. Kan. May 1, 2014) (the D&O policy excluded coverage for “matters 
uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this Policy is construed”). 
 222.  See, e.g., MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A CONTEXT 
AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free market economy by 
providing certainty for those involved in exchanging goods and services.  If a merchant 
knows the legal consequences of her negotiating efforts or of the language she selects for 
her contracts, she can act accordingly.  This predictability encourages people to enter into 
contracts, secure in the knowledge that those contracts will be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, 
Contract Law and Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) (“Long-term 
contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly intractable problem: in the long term events 
are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future obligations and 
payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”). 
 223.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §178 (1981) (stating that terms may be 
unenforceable on public policy grounds). 
 224.  See Id. at §179, cmt. a (commenting that the rule which allows for the derivation of 
public policy is “an open-ended one that does not purport to exhaust the categories of 
recognized public policies”). 
 225.  Id. at §178(1). 
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With respect to the availability and enforceability of D&O insurance, 
the legislatures have spoken: insurance is allowed to be purchased and to 
insure shareholder claims against corporate managers, which typically are 
claims sounding in fraud for which restitution is sought.226  Consequently, 
because legislatures have spoken, judges should not substitute their own 
judgment for the people’s judgment regarding the controlling public policy. 
Of course, in addition to potentially assessing public policy 
incorrectly, another problem with courts substituting their own views on 
public policy for legislatures’ with respect to insurance matters is that it can 
also lead to the unjust enrichment of insurers and the frustration of the 
reasonable expectations of policyholders.  For example, if a D&O policy or 
a CGL policy were not enforced after the policyholder has paid a premium 
and acted in accordance with the reasonable expectation that it has 
insurance, then the insurer would be unjustly enriched because it has 
collected and retained a premium in exchange for illusory coverage.  Thus, 
in such circumstances, although it is the policyholder who allegedly has 
been unjustly enriched according to the allegations of the underlying 
plaintiffs, the insurer undoubtedly would be unjustly enriched if it were 
allowed to collect a premium for a policy that purports to cover the types of 
claims at issue but it were not required to actually cover such claims when 
they were asserted.  In such a situation, not only would the insurer be 
unjustly enriched at the policyholder’s expense, but in many cases the 
underlying plaintiffs would also be deprived of a significant, if not only, 
source of funds available to pay their losses.  It is hard to imagine how the 
prevailing public policy could favor such a result. 
CONCLUSION 
So, do liability insurance policies cover claims for restitution?  Yes.  
Should they be allowed to do so?  Yes. 
Insurers are sophisticated entities that draft the language contained in 
liability policies.  They collect substantial premiums for policies that 
purport to provide broad coverage unless the type of claim at issue is 
expressly excluded.  Under the rules of policy interpretation, most versions 
of standard form D&O policies and CGL policies cover “losses” and 
 
 226.  See supra Part B and note 70.  Even in the absence of clear legislative guidance, 
some courts have expressly stated their reluctance to hold that public policy disallows 
insurance for the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains when such losses are otherwise covered 
under liability policies.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc., 308 P.2d 1196, 1200 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“The policy forbidding insurance coverage for restitutionary 
payments in Arizona is not strong; it has never been expressed in any legislation or judicial 
decisions . . . . [T]he public has a countervailing interest in the enforcement of insurance 
policies . . . .”). 
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“damages” without excluding coverage for claims for restitution.  Thus, 
such claims are covered under the terms of the policies and insurers should 
be required to honor the terms of the deals they enter with policyholders.  If 
insurers were not required to do so, particularly in the context of securities 
fraud claims, then the D&O policies that insurers sell would provide only 
illusory coverage for the most common types of claims asserted against 
corporate managers that purportedly are covered by such policies. 
The theoretical and public policy bases for disallowing insurance to 
cover claims for restitution implicitly or explicitly were rejected long ago 
when legislatures and courts allowed liability insurance to cover punitive 
damages and intentional torts.  Although there are legitimate theoretical 
and public policy concerns raised by allowing insurance to cover claims for 
restitution, such concerns are outweighed by the competing public policy 
interests of enforcing the terms of contracts and compensating innocent 
victims. 
 
